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Chapter 1
INTHODUCTION
At 7:45 avm. April 30, 1975, all American helicopter landed on the
roof of the American Embassy in Saigon, South Vietnam. It had come to
p i ck up t.ne last remnants of the official united States presence in
Vietn8111: eleven Marines, the final defenders of the embassy. Most
other Americans who wanted to leave had been evacuated the previous day.
South Vietnrun had effectively come under the control of North Vietnam and
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the PRG, or
Viet Cong). \4ith the exit of the eleven Marines, the United States ended
its interventionary role in Vietn81J1. The intervention had been a fail-
are; it had not prevented the demise of the Republic of Vietnam (South
Vi et.nam ) .1
Vietnamese society had been all but destroyed in the American
effort to preserve a South vi et.namese political establishment acceptable
to the United States. French colonialists had swept away the historical
Vietnamese state and the village-based soc The A~ericans destroyed
what remained as the essence of Vietnam: the land and the f'anri.Ly , Many
people, inc civilians, died in the tng, and various hmerican
and Amer-ic an-d nst progr ams removed many others from their land.
ziano 'I'er-z am ,
19'76), p , <34.
1
(New York: St. Martin's Press,
2And the revolution continued, all the way through the denouement in the
spring of 1975. 1
Though Amer-Lcans stayed in Vietnam that long) there was a crucial
turning point in their intervention seven years earlier. In a sense, an
end was reached in early 1968, in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive.
The offensive, a well-planned move by North Vietnamese Army troops and
Viet Cong insurgents, was the high point of the military action in the
Second Indochina War. It was a simultaneous surprise attack on nearly
every city, town and major military base in South Vietnam. 2
The Tet Offensive taught Americans that the Viet Cong and the
North Vietnamese Army had not been weakened by years of fighting American
troops and enduring American air bombardment. The American public became
persuaded that the enemy could not be defeated; it no longer believed the
Johnson aQministration's optimistic appraisals to the contrary.3
The American government reversed its military policy after the
Tet Offensive. It put new limits on U. s. participation. At the begin-
ning of March, 1968, the goverD~ent was considering raising the number of
American troops in Vietnam from 510,000 to more than 700,000; removing
restrictions that had prevented the ground war from spreading into Laos,
Cambodia and North Vietnam, and lifting the remaining restraints on the
bombing of Hanoi, Haiphong and other strategic targets.
IFrances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake (Boston: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 19(2), p. 429.
Oberdorfer, Tet! (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 19(1),
p , Lx .
Praeger,
Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History (Ne\.J York:
p.
3By the end of March, all of these proposals had been scrapped.
Gen. William C. Hestmoreland, the military commander- in Vietnam,. had
been reassigned to the Pentagon, President Johnson had said he would not
seek re-election, and the U.S. bombers had stopped operations over most
of North Vietnam. l
Of course, the war did not end abruptly. President Nixon con-
tinued it, introducing Vietnamization as his contribution to the history
of funerican involvement in Vietnam. Yet Nixon was able to go on with the
war only by progressively reducing the number of American troops (and
therefore casualties), and by lowering the level of U.S. expenditures.
His emphasis on "peace with honor" helped win public support for his
policies, too; the catch-phrase was appealing to many for the face-saving
it connoted. But a corner had been turned and America was on its way out
of Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. 2
This is not to minimize the carnage that occurred after 1968:
the Christmas, 1972, air raids on North Vietnam, for example. But after
1968 American objectives were altered. They became more closely aligned
with the resources required to achieve them. Strategy was modified be-
cause the political and material costs of attaining the original objec-
tives were considered to be too high. Policy-makers realized the United
States could not destroy the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong nor elimi-
nate them completely from South Vietna'11. 3
The Tet Offensive will be the end mark of this thesis as well.
The thesis Hill attempt to describe and analyze the goals and policies of
fer, p. 280. 20berdorfer, p. x.
3Douglas Kinnard,
Press of NCr! and, 19'77
(Hanover, N.H.: Universi
4American intervention in Vietnam up to that time. The focus will be on
the content and efficacy of the interventionist policy.
United States-Vietnarn Relations 2 1945 1967 2 commonly known as
the Pentagon Paper-s, will be the primary source used in defining the
goals and policies of U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers
cons ti tute a unique 2 quasi-official record. 'I'he multi-volume study was
done at the behest of then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who
directed that the study be encyclopedic and objective. The Papers were
prepared in secret in 1967-68 by thirty-six people from the military
services, the departments of state and defense and civilian think-tanks. l
IIAn extended internal critique based on the documentary record,"
the Papers present a middle-echelon, official view of United states in-
tervention in Vietnarn. The authors did not have full access to the files
of the Department of state, the president or Central Intelligence Agency.
Therein lie some of the Papers I limitations. 2
An evaluation of the goals and policies that marked U.s. inter-
vention in Vietnam will be based on the data and analysis in the exten-
sive v r i tings of the late French-American historian 2 Bernard Fall. Fall
had an abiding interest in Vietnarn from at least the early 1950s until
his death in 1967. One of the earliest authorities on Vietnam, Fall
lU.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, United
-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, , 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
20, 1971 1tlashington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p , ix.
Future references to this source v i Tl use the common term,
Pentagon Papers, GPO ed., and include Book (Bk) number, section, subsec-
tion and page nQmbers.
2Ne il Sheehan and others, 'rhe Pentaf,on Papers as Published by
the New York 'fimes (New York; Barrt am , 1971), p , x i x,
Future references to thi source will be as follows:
Times ed, , page number.
5wrote seven books and hundreds of articles on aspects of the sUbject,
which he knew first-hand because of his visits to the country. He was
killed on his sixth trip there. l Fall's expertise makes his analysis
valuable in its own right, and his independent-scholar orientation makes
his vTri tings useful in evaluating the Pentagon Papers. Fall's views
definitely are not quasi-official.
Before a discussion of Ameri.can goals and policies in Vietnam can
go any further, it is necessary to d.es Lgnat.e a starting point. \'!hen did
the U.S. interventionary role begin? Answering that question requires an
operational definition of intervention.
Interyention has to do with modifying the behavior of persons
and groups in another nation in a way that wouJd not have occurred in the
absence of the intervening nation's activities. Intervention is a
success when the modifications come about, a failure when they do not.
Influence, then, is at the heart of intervention.
influence, however, is extremely difficult. Changes in
political behavior must be charted, illld the changes must be related to a
set of actors. The risk is that the behavior might have taken place in
any case, without to induce it. Any number of factors can and
are involved in behavior modification. It is little wonder then that
Lnt.er-vent.i.on , an Lnt.e rnat.Lor.e.L influencing mechanism, has so far tended
to defy scientific inquiry.
James N. Ros eriau insists that scientific analysis of interven-
tion should lJe tried nevE,rt,J1E;J..E;SS, because ir.terventions are real-life
phenomena. They engage the r.inds and talents of and
Doubleday,
Fall, Refl'::ctions on a Hal' (Garden City, N. Y. :
) ~ pp ~ 9 ~ 10 ~
6citizens. They cost money and often lives. In short, they are a prob-
lem of world politics. To help develop a scientific theory of inter-
vention, Rosen'iu has suggested that an intervention can be identified
by two traits: its conv"mticn-breaking nature and its aut.hor-Ity-
oriented character.
The first of these characteristics highlights widespread
agr.eemen t on the finite and transitory nature of interven-
tions. Virtually all Lhe historical cases cited in the liter-
ature are conceived to have a beginning (when conventional
modes of conduct are abandoned) and an end (when convent.t onal.
modes are restored or the convention-breakine mode becomes
conventional througb persistent use). Their consequences for
the tareet society may be profound alid enduring, but once the
consequences become accepted and es t abLt shed , the behavior i:.3
no longer regarded as interventionary even if the presence of
the intervening actor in the target society remains undiminished.
Sharp br-eaks 'trith conventional patterns are not called interven-
tions, Rosenau maintains, unless they are political; that is, convention-
breaking beh avi.o r must be "addressed to those who make the decisions
that are bindinG for the entire society and/or to the processes through
wtich such decisions are made. 1I Both characteristics e.re necessary to
identi 8n intervention.
A priLcipal virtue of this operational definition of interven-
tion is that it nar r-ovs the subject to a manageabLe size. This is
especially valuable with respect to Vietnam, vhere foreign involvement
has been so complex and of such duration that it is necessary to limit
the scope of analysis. This definition also :is a check treH.t-
ing all foreign policy actions as interventionary, as can be done if a
strictly common sense usage of "d nt.er-vent i.on" is applied.
Rosenau sees another advantage of \- .dlS definition; It avoids
int': Lut.e r veut.Lon v it.h colonialism or Lalism. These, he says,
involve the continued presence of the inte actor in the t,
7society } while Lnt.ervent.Lons come to an end. It s eems , however} that
interventions can have colonialistic and imperialistic objectives} and
that using this operational definition of intf'rventiorl helps but IittIe
to draw a elear line between the phenomena. 1
As the American role in Vietnam grew and policies evolved} new
practices often broke sharply with the past. Most were authority..:
oriented. Through use} trley became' converrt Lona.l., In this respect}
there was a series of "Lrrber-vent.Lons " within t.he t'r amevor-k of a common-
sensical intervention. It would be a mistake to ignore this COlffinonsense
meaning. Rosenau's contribution is to facilitate identification and
analysis of cruci events and condit ions .,ithin this larger context.
Using Rosenau t s definition, Ame r i c an intervention can be da-ted
from 1950, the year tile so-called "Bao Dai solution" came to fruition.
The F'r-ench had been vork i.ng for the establishment of a nat.Lon a.l ist
Vietnamese government under Prince Baa Dai. When thts came about in
1950, Ho Chi Minh denounced the new government and tbe Kremlin in turn
reCOGnized Ho's government. This, in the opinion of then-Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, revealed no "In h is true colors as the mortal enemy
of native independence in Indochina. 11 The Un i ted ~,tates reccgnized
Baa Dai and s con provided aiel. It Has from then on deeply involved in
t i . t 2Vietnarn, firmly set on an an l-COl!iInUnlS - course.
An anonymous Pont.agon Papers author described the American back-
int; of Bao Dbi and the French in 1950 as a "remarkable volte-face."
IJ8.liles N. Ros enau , The fcientific study of Foreign Policy
(Ne\.J YOl'¥:: 'l'he Free Press, 1971), pp. 290-295·
GPO ed., Bk 1, Se2lion I, p.
8Earlier, there had been overtures toward Ho in the form of modest aid
to the Viet Minh the Office of Strategic Services. Just what the
American attitude had been before 1950 is debated. Some believe Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt was ambivalent about Indochina that he never,
made up his mind whether to support the French in reclaiming its colony
after "It/orld War II. Others, notably Bernard Fell, felt FDR was deter-
mined to eliminate the French from Indochina at all costs; hence the
U.S. flirtation with Ho and the unwillingness to help France before
1950.
U.S. policy toward Indochina had a low priority right after the
war. European economic recovery and collective security in the face of
a perceived communist threat were more important than Vietnamese nation-
alism. \~lile U.S. leaders had reservations about reinstatement of a
French colonial presence in Indochina after the war, they drifted along
with France toward the Baa Dai solution.
Americans Here put off by Ho's suspected communism, and they
were cognizant of the vieHs of Great Britain, which wanted the future of
Indochina left in French hands. The interests of big-power cooperation
in Europe prevailed. l
Probably the chief policy-maker at the t.i.me was Dean Acheson,
secretary of state from 1949 to 1953. He was most responsible for the
early U. S. cornm.i tment to Vietnam. Yet he was a prisoner of European
ions of communism and of "corrt at nraent . It Asia was of little
interest to him; it was less important than Europe.
On a state visit to America in 1949, Prime Hinister Jawaharlal
CPO ed., Bk 1, Section I, pp. , IH.
9Nehru of India warned Acheson that Baa Dai would not succeed as a leader
because he lacked character , ability and prestige, and because the
French would not give him enough authority. Nehru urged Acheson to re-
gard Ho Chi Minh as an alternative, as a nationalist first and a com-
munist second. Acheson was inclined to agree with Nehru about the weak-
nesses of Bao Dai, but he saw no alternative, and certainly not in
Ho Chi Minh ,
In India and Burma, communists had begun as the left wing
of the nationalist movement, then attempted to take over the
movement and failed. This, (Nehru) hoped, would be repeated
in Indochina. To me this was a clearly specious idea~ since,
as the experience of both France and Italy showed, the attempt
to take over voul.d be inevitable and the outcome would depend
on the strength of the other side. With the leadership of the
nationalist movement already in Ho's hands, the outcome in
Indochina would seem pretty clear. l
The policy of containment, which vas embraced even more heartily
by the next secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, might have been ap-
propriate for Europe, where the threat was primarily military, but it
did not work in Asia, where the threat was political. Military contain-
ment is irrelevant where weak govermnents are targets for communism.
Moreover, corr~unism did not stay monolithic, if it ever had been; yet
American policy-makers pursued a Vietnarrl policy blind to this reality.2
Thus the inauspicious beginning of ~merican intervention in
Vietnam: intervention based on a narrow view of communism and initiated
in the context of H no real alternatives."
lDean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969),
p. 335.
v
Handam House,
t;Jorgenthau, "He Are Deluding Ourselves in Viet-Nam, II The
eds Bernard Fall and Marcus G. Haskin (Ne\<l York:
...> .. ., - .,
1965), pp. 38, 41.
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The United States had intervened in an internal war , a ,Tar
caused by grievances within a country and fought in the country. The
contending forces were engaged in political violence. Incumbents and
insurgents were using force in attempts to control political behavior
and accomplish political objectives. Various kinds of force can be used
in internal wars: retaliatory repression of governments, terrorism by
extremists~ assassinations~ student riots~ mass uprisings~ coups d'etat,
guerrilla warfare. l
Internal wars can be classified according to their goals. Per-
sonnel wars, primarily coups, are over who fills existing roles in the
government; policy does not change appreciably, just personalities.
Authority wars are contests over how the roles are arranged in the struc-
ture of political authority; anti-colonialist struggles are in this cate-
gory. Structural wars entail changes in substructures of a society~ as,
for example, the system of ownership or the educational system.
The war in VIetnam vas a structural internal war; it Involved a
communist-nationalist faction intent on making major changes in the
society. P.n agrarian revolt or a black-majority fight against whi te-
supremacist rulers (in South Africa, for instance, where apartheid is
at stake) could be labeled structural wars, too. Of course, these also
would be personnel and authority wars. So a structural war is the most
comprehensive type of internal war.
'I'h i s type offers the greatest potential for change wi t.h i n a
soci For this reason it makes other nations uneasy. 'I'hey are more
1James N. Rosenau,
Internati
N. J.: Prlnceton
"Internal \.Jar as an International Event,"
ed. , .Iames N. Rosenau (Princeton,
), p. 45.
11
likely to take notice and intervene in a. structural war than in other
kinds. l
In fact, wide-ranging intervention has been a phenomenon of the
post-World vIal' II vorLd , A study of interventions involving troops
actively deployed inside a target country showed fifty-eight nations
were the object of interventionary activity between 1948 and 196T. Of
the fifty-eight target nations, forty-seven were in Asia, the Mideast or
Africa. Of thirty-four intervening countries, twenty-seven were in
these regions. The United states and Great Britain were the most fre-
quent interveners.
Regional power balances or ideology, two elements of interven-
tion in Vietna.'11, were the leading reasons for intervention. Thirty of
fi f't.y-e i ght. Lar-ge--pover- interventions had to do with regional balances,
s i xt.een wi t.h ideology. Ddet arrt interventions were undertaken mostly by
large poverc and were friendly interventions, I , e., in support of exist-
governments. 2
These statistics report only military interventions. \{hen one
remembers that Ln t e.rverrt Lons can be non-military as well, the extensive-
ness of the phenomenon is driven home. Indeed, defining intervention
as an militill'y encroac~'11ent on a nation's sovereignty is ont-
model now that many non-military modes exist. The aid-giving process
eriau, "Internal VIal' as an International Event," pp. 63,
64, 66)
t.e rverrt ion ,I'
443) 1,53.
and Foreign f1 i Li t ary In-
XVIII ( ) ,
12
car. cons tit.ut.e intervention, as it did when the U. S. began helping the
French in Indochina. 1
Many factors enter into decisions to intervene. (Intervention
is being defined as convention-breaking behavior directed at authority
structures.)
Under what conditions is a nation or an international or-
ganization likely to be ready to break ':dth the prevailing
mod.e of conduct and attempt to alter or pr-eaer-ve the structure
of authority in another society? To what extent are develop-
ments within nations or international organizations likely to
heighten their propensities to engage in such behavior? To
'dhat extent are differences mnong individual leaders, role-
generated perceptions of bureaucracies, and the nature of con-
stitutionc..l restraints likely to contribute to interventionary
propensities? To what extent are developments within the
authority structure of a nation likely to attract convention-
breaking behavior on the part of actors external to it? To
wliat, extent are the dynamics of intervention to be found. . .
elsewhere in the international system'? In short, "hat is the
relative potency of individual, role, governmental, societal,
and emic variables v i th regard ~o intervention as a form
of i\).ceign or international policy?
Policy-makers usually feel little or no pUblic pressure to inter-
vene in another nation 1 s affair's. The public is passive t.ovard foreign
affairs. Moreover, interventions have elements of surprise and secrecy
not associated 'dith or::en public discussion. So the societal variable is
unim-rortant.3 Also relatively insie<;nificant is the governmental struc-
Lure of an intervening nation. Nation", v i t.h strong cabinet systems,
weak cabinet ems, many or fev farties intervene. So do totalitar-
. t' 4lan na lon:::;.
Aid, Intervention, and Influence,lt
), 425.
Baldwin,
World Politics, XXI (tpril,
'::'he Scienti ric Study of Foreign Polic,i:', p . 297.
enau , p. l\V;:' < L1GU, , p.
13
Rather than the shape of government, the crucial factor is its
leadership. Individual and bureaucratic role variables are potent
sources of intervention.
It could well be argued that interventions are more excLu-
s ively a consequence of' dec i s i.on-mak i ng ac t I vi ty than any other
type of foreign policy, that assessments of the need for and
probable outcome of interventionary behavior are more subject
to tr,e whims of individual leaders and the dynamics of bureau-
cratic structures thDu the diplomatic, economic, military, Hnd
poI.i. tic aI policies through vhi.ch nations conventionally relate
themselves to the international system. l
~""~.~J , the makeup of the international system is important in
dec i e i ons to intervene. The structure of the system, the extent to
Hhich the structure is sustained by ideological rivalry, and the stabil-
i ty of nations are sys t emtc variables. 2
The international l10litical system is a loose bi system of
t.wo contending blocs, each wi.t.h an interest in opposing or preventing
internal in a country that might drive that country out of its
bloc and into the oppos
hUTts the otheC'.3
bloc. In short, each bloc wants change that
Loose bipolarity developed mainly because communism did. Forma-
tion of a c omrnun i s t bloc led to a counter bloc, the so-called Free \'lorld
or Western bloc. Eefore the rise of political movements, such as com-
mun i sm, that crous ed nat.i ona.l boundaries, a ba.l ence.-of'e-pover- sys t e:n cb-
tained. Nation-states were the only significant actors; ttey sought to
senau, p.
"::l1I.lU, p , 300.
i30l1rces , t1
Some Systemic
> Rosenau, p. 106.~~~::"'::":::':':':::':~..:::..J;;:.:::,:::"::,,:::,,,-:,:--::--.:..::-.c~~..c:...::...-,-
Internal wars per-
14
maintain the independence of other states to ensure a system of con-
stantly shifting coalitions. l
Under the balance-of-power syGtem, a prevailing interest was in
keeping internal vrars--like the one in Vietnrun--Internal. Gener-e.Ll.y ,
this is not true with loose bipolarity; intervention is to be expected
as power blocs vie for member-nations. 2
However, according to the model of loose bipolarity, the pover
blocs have an interest in leaving some uncommitted states alone. Their
function is to be mediators; they try to settle disputes, prevent small
wars from spreading, etc. To the extent that uncommitted nations can
enunciate apparently impartial criteria for resolving differences be-
tween blocs, they are invaluable peacekeepers. 3
As for ideological rivalry in the international system, when it
is intense decision-makers are inclined to regard possible governmental
h t d .. 4c anges somewhere in he worl as qUlte lmportant.
ceived to be instigated by an external power have especially strong in-
ternational repercussions. National leaders, recognizing that another
national power or power bloc is attempting to expand its influence in a
society by spreading chaos, are quick to consider their options~ includ-
ing intervention. 5
Probably the most systemic variable is the stabi of
nations. The more unstable the authority structure of a foreign country,
the more likely it is that it will be the object of an intervention
n.o.}'""-o.u ~ p. 112.
1\.0.IJ""-<1.11, pp. 97,
2.Kaplan, p , 115.
en au , T'be Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, p. 301.
enau, !I Har as an Int.ernat Iona.l Event, II p . 79.
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by another nation. Governments are ever alert to unstable conditions
abroad, ready to maintain order or exploit disorder. l
So individual, role and. systemic variables are critical when it
comes to decisions on intervention. These variables will be discussed
with respect to American intervention in Vietnam in the concluding
chapter.
United States intervention involved a large, powerful nation
acting in support of a small, weak nation against a third nation that
also was small. The ensuing conflict was asymmetrical: a confrontation
between seemingly unequal foes. In its nature and its outcome, the
American experience in Vietnam fit the pattern evident in a number of
post-World War II conflicts, a pattern which in fact was a break with
the past.
In Algeria, Cyprus, Morocco, Tunisia and Indochina, local
nationalist forces confronted industrial powers possessing strong armies
--and "won , II They political victories by resisting defeat until
the political capabilities of their opponents to fight on were exhausted.
It was demonstrated in Vietnam that conventional military super-
iori ty, vh i.ch clearly lay with the United States, was insufficient. The
war was fought in Vietnam and in the political and social institutions
of Amer i ca , vher e disenchantment grew and blossomed into opposition.
Eventually, the protracted warfare enunciated chiefly by Mao Tse-tung,
the wiLl.Lngne s s to absorb the hi costs of fighting a technologically
strong over an extended period of time, was successful. 2
enau , The Scient Hie Study, p. 301.
'I'he Polit ics
197»),
Nations Lose Small Hal'S;
cs, XXVII (.:.:..:::.::...::::::--=-~-'---'--~
Mac k , l1\fhy
Conflict,1Iof'
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Ame r i can military aims wer-e to control territory and "punt sh"
the enemy into giving up. In adhering to this strategy, American lead-
ers ignored, or failed to see, the nature of guerrilla warfare and of
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong perseverance.
lie fought a military war; our opponents fought a political
one. vIe sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for
our psychological eXhaustion. In the process, we lost sight
of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla
wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it
does not win .... In a guerrilla war, purely military con-
siderations are not decisive; psychological and political
factors loom at least as large. l
Let us now look to the Pentagon Papers for a description of how
the knericans lost by not winning.
XLVII (January,
, "'Hie Viet Nam
214, 215.
iations,lI
Chapter 2
VIETNAM POLICIES AND POLICY-MAKING
The Pentagon Papers consist of 3,000 pages of narrative history
and more than 4,000 pages of appended documents (about 2.5 million words
altogether) in forty-seven volumes. They took a year and a half to
prepare. The period of history covered is from World War II to May,
1968, when peace talks began in Paris after President Johnson had limit-
ed further military commitments and announced his intention not to seek
re-election. 1
The Papers describe what decisions were made, Why they were made
and by whom. It is a unique record, though a flawed one by virtue of
restrictions placed on the authors and because of the affiliation of the
authors. These shortcomings, however, will be discussed in a later
chapter. This chapter will relate, with a minimum of analysis, the
goals and policies detailed in the Pentagon study.
The Papers were written in this context: Once basic policy had
been set, the internal debate among American decision-makers was on how
to reach the , not on the goals themselves. The underlying belief
was that cOIMwnism had to be stopped to prevent its spread, domino-
style, to other countries in the region. This premise for the American
lneil Sheehfu'1 and others,
the Hew York Times (Nev York: Bantam,
18
intervention "lent virtually unchallenged throughout the debate, which
lasted from about 1950 through at least 1967. 1
As has been said, a watershed decision was made in 1950, when
the United States decided to support Bao Dai and the French against the
Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh. 2 The major catalyst behind this de-
cision was the demise of the Kuomintang in China. 3 China's fall to the
cOmL~unists ended what had been a period of great ambivalence for Ameri-
can policy-makers.
Roosevelt had been undecided, and Harry Truman aided neither the
French nor Ho Chi Minh, though the latter sent a series of letters ask-
ing for U.S. help.4 American support of Ho would have required an acute
perception of communism and nationalism which policy-makers did not
possess. They had a blurred vision of national or independent commu-
nism. Backing Ho would have involved great risk for U.S. decision-
makers, for they could not see Ho as an Asian counterpart to the rela-
tively independent THo of Yugoslavia. They were afraid of Vietnamese
expansionism under Ho, so the path of prudence seemed advisable. 5
lpentagon Papers, Times ed., p. xix.
2U.S., Congress, House, Corrunittee on Armed Services, United
States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Hearing, 92nd Cong., Ls t Sess.,
ember 20, 1971 (Hashington: Government Printing Office, 1971),
Book 1, Section I, p. A-15.
3Gabriel Kolko, liThe American Goals in Vietnam, !I The Pentagon
Papen:;, Senator Gravel Edition, V, eds., No am Chomsky and Howard Zinn
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 3.
11 Papers GPO ed. Bk 1 I p. A-24.Pentagon , , -L , ,
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Non-intervention by the U.S. on the side of Ho was tantamount to the ac-
ceptilnce of the French and their llsolution ll for Vietnam~l
Between 1950 and 1954, the United States provided military aid
to French forces fighting the Viet Minh. The French asked for more
help: for U.S. air strikes in disguised planes, for example. But Presi-
dent Eisenhower thought it would be a "tragic error" to intervene di-
rectly in Vietnam to help the French. 2 A "united action" approach by
the United States, France and Great Britain had been suggested as a way
of defeating the Viet Minh, but the British were cool to the idea and it
was overtaken by events, specifically the fall of the French outpost,
Dien Bien Phu, to the Viet Minh. 3 This was, in effect, the end of the
French Indochina War.
The fall of Dien Bien Phu prompted a reappraisal of the situa-
tion in Indochina. Hhereas a year earlier the loss of Indochina to com-
munism and a negotiated settlement of the conflict had been deemed a
threat to the security of the U.S. and all of Southeast Asia, in 1954
American policy-makers revised their opinion. The loss of Vietnam no
longer was seen as necessarily leadir:.g to communist control of all of 1n-
dochina. 4 Nevertheless, the implied threat of American intervention was
allowed to stand, and the U.S. role at the peace talks in Geneva was that
of a passive observer firmly opposed to co-signing the peace treaty.5
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The National Security Council, meeting August 8 and 12, 1951~,
decided the Geneya pact partitioning Vietnam was a disaster, a major
step forward for the communists. l The NBC then decided to provide eco-
norai.c and. mili tary aid to Ngo Dinh Diem. who had replaced Baa Dai as the
leader of the new South Vietnam. American decision-makers cast their
lot i-ri ttl Diem despite U.S. intelligence reports that he was weak and un-
popular among Vietnamese. 2
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles saw no one else to support
except Diem; he t.hcugrrt only Diem could lead South Vietnam. 'I'hl.s was an
issue over which the ffinericans and the French disagreed. The French ob-
ject,ed to Diem, one official calling him "not, only incapable but mad. 113
Before Dulles's declaration of support for Diem. in 1955, Gen. J.
Lawton Collins, the U.S. representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
zation military committee. had been sent to Saigon to help Diem's
government. Among other things. Collins was to aid Diem in counteract-
Viet Minh infiltration. Soon, however. Collins was urging that an
alternative to Diem be found. He recommended returning to Bao Dai or
reconsidering an e~rlier propo3al to gradually withdrAW from Vietnam.
Later. though. Collins changed his mind and Dulles stood by Diem. 4
Arce r i can support of the South Vi.etnamese leader continued even
after he ignored the provision of the Geneva pact that called for COUG-
try-wide elections in 1956 to determine a goverlliuent for Vietnam. North
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and South. l Diem insisted he was not bound by the Geneva accords because
he did not s them; the French did. This was true despite the fact
that technically South Vietnam was independent by the time of the peace
conference. Diem did have grounds for repudiating the agreements.
Diem might have won the plebiscite, according to the Papers
authors. This seems highly doubtful; earlier, President Eisenhower es-
timated that Ho Chi Minh would have won eighty percent of the vote. In
any event, when Diem refused to hold the elections, neither Britain nor
the Soviet Union, two signers of the peace agreement, pressed the mat-
2ter. For its part, the United States adopted the view that Hanoi would
not have allowed free general elections anyhow and the International
Control Commission, set up to administer the 1954 peace pact, could not
have adequately supervised them. 3
The rejection of the elections meant reunification could be
achieved only by a resort to force. The policy of Diem, and American
support of it, led to a test of strength with North Vietnam, which, the
t · I' d .. 4Papers say, was motivated by na lona lsm an expanslonlsm.
By the end of the 19508, then, South Vietnam was the creation of
the United States. Without the U.S. intervention, Diem would not have
'lnsolidated his hold on the country in 1955-%, he would not have re-
ed to discuss the 1956 elections, and he would not have survived
thout American aid. And all the while, intelligence experts continued
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to assess Diem as weak and lacking support among his people. l (Why the
intelligence reports failed to sway American decision-makers is not ad-
dressed in the Papers.)
The lack of support for Diem among Vietnamese is critical. U. S.
intelligence reports concluded that the insurgency in South Vietnam be-
gan mainly as a rebellion against the oppressive Diem regime. 2 "The
growth of apathy and considerable dissatisfaction among the rural popu-
lace" was a major cause of the insurgency.
There were three periods of insurgency: from 1954-56, when the
situation was quiet and only the political struggle was going on;
1956-58, When dissidenL cadres in the South began to actively rebel,3
and 1959, when the Politburo in Hanoi decided to support aggression in
the South. 4
Diem alienated mffilY elements in South Vietnam which might have
offered him political support. He was egregiously incompetent in rural
programs. His failure to carry out land reforms could have in itself
caused a rebellion without help from North Vietnam. 5 Diem promised
farmers much and delivered little. 'I'he result was that he was deeply
6resented by the peasants. A structured rebellion against the Diem
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regime began in 1957 and 158. Host of the rebels were South Vietnamese;
the causes they fought for had evolved in the South, not in Hanoi. 1
The official U.S. position was that North Vietnam had manipu-
1ated the ent struggle in South Vietnam. The case for this, accord-
ing to the Pentagon Papers, is not wholly compelling. An alternative
view might be that North Vietnam seized a chance to enter an ongoing in-
terna1 war in 1959. The truth, according to the equivocal authors, is
o
somewhere in between.L.
There were some North Vietnamese communists in the South from
1954 to 1960, but they had not been directed to mount an insurgency. The
period from 1956-59 was one of reorganizing and recruiting for the Com-
munist Party. Iv1oreover, there were no direct links between Hanoi and the
rural terrorists in the South. It was only at the end of the decade that
Hanoi's involvement became evident. Until then, the United States had
not seen that Diem was in trouble, that he was in danger of being over-
thrown. 3 American policy-makers had considered Diem a miracle-worker.
Although they recognized his oppressive tendencies, they focused on his
accomplishments and compared him favorably with other Asian rulers. 4
American policy after 1954 was not directed toward altering the
status quo, i.e., the fact of two Vietn~ls. It was conservative, with
the emphasis on organizing collective security against cormnunism. 5
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Dulles, in a cable to the American embassy in Saigon, said the United
States should not ar-t "t'0 speed u·p of of~ present process decay Geneva
accords" but not make "slightest effort to infuse life into them."l The
accords were allowed by the South Vietnamese and Americans to decay.
The settlement failed to provide a lasting peace because it was just a
truce in an ongoing war. 2
Though the var continued, few American officials were worried
about it as the 1950s drew to a close. Intelligence estimates in the
SU1JUner of 1959 were to the effect that the situation in Vietnam was un...
happy but not unstable. This was the state of affairs when President
John Kennedy took office in 1961. Kennedy dealt with Vietnam only oc-
casionally during most of his first year as president. 3
In April of 1961, Kennedy ordered 400 Special Forces troops and
100 more A~erican advisers to South Vietnam. He thus signaled American
wi ..I. ul'\".<';; " S to go beyond the strictures of the Geneva accords, which
limited military advisers to 685. If done openly, the move would have
been the first formal breech of the accords; it was not done openly,
however. 4 Kennedy also ordered clandestine warfare by South Vietnamese
agents against North Vietnam. 5
Late in 1961, South Vietnamese president Diem asked for a bi-
lateral defense treaty with the United States and for an A~erican
1Pentagon Papers, Times ed., p. 3.
2 Papers, GPO e d , Bk 2 IV, p. 11.Pentagon , ,
3pentagon Papers , GPO e d , , Bk 2, IV, Bl, pp. 1-3.
GPO cd., Bk 2, IV, Bl, p. 30.
'I'Line s cd., p .
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military build-up. Diem was concerned about the grmring power of the
Viet Cong and abo~t what the VC attacks were doing to confidence in his
govermnent. To investigate first hand, the president sent his personal
military adviser, Oen.Maxwell Taylor, to Vietnam in October. In making
the Taylor mission public, Kennedy was vague about its purpose. Never-
theless, the press reported that the general would study the need for
funerican troops.
After making his assessment, Taylor proposed sending 6,000-8,000
A.merican troops in the guise of a flood-relief contingent. He envision-
ed a massive South Vietnamese-American effort to combat flooding in the
Mekong Delta--and to combat communists. The introduction of dedicated
Americans, Taylor thought, could solve South Vietnam's problems. l Other
officials were skeptical; Secretary of State Dean Rusk questioned the
wi s dom of investing so much in a "losing horse. ,,2
Taylor's report Vias founded on two ideas: A firm, unambiguous
military commitment would remove doubts about U.S. resolve to fight com-
munism in Asia; the doubts had arisen because of the deteriorating
Western position in neighboring Laos. Second, Diem's Vieaknesses--his
poor administration and his army's lack of offensive spirit--could be
overcome if enough Americans showed the Vietnamese hO'1 to win the war. 3
There actually was little debate among the policy-makers on
sending troops at this stage; there was even less public debate.
decided to send support units, not combat soldiers. He did not
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embrace an unqualified commitment to save South Vietnam from the COITlJnU-
nists. Kennedy, however, did initiate an attempt to focus public and
diplomatic activity on infiltration from North Vietnam.
Moreover, the president wanted to press Diem to make some reforms
in his government. He urged Diem be told that U.S. willingness to offer
more help to South Vietnam would depend on whether reforms were forthcom-
ing, especially reforms that broadened Diem's political base. So
Kennedy held out to Diem less than the South Vietnamese leader was ex-
pecting, and he sought internal changes Diem was unprepared to make. l
One source of optimism among U.S. policy-makers was the strate-
gic-hamlet program formally adopted by Diem in mid-March, 1962. The aim
of the program was to regroup Vietnamese civilians into fortified ham-
lets where members of the Viet Cong could be weeded out and popular al-
legiance to the Diem government won through better security and improved
services. 2
It did not take long for the optimism to drain away. The pro-
gram had difficulties from the start. For one thing, the American mili-
tary, the U.S. civilian arm and the Diem government had different per-
spectiyes and ideas. The military wanted to clear out VC; the civilians
stressed build-up of the South Vietnamese infrastructure; Diem wanted to
use the program to control not only the commun i s t.s but his own people. 3
By mid-1963, the U.S. alternatives were to try to make Diem change the
pr-ogr am , allow him to run it
rid of Diem. l
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own way and hope for the best, or get
American decision-makers pursued the first course, but, in the
"lords of the Papers authors. the strategic-hamlet program "failed di.s-
mally." Diem and the Americans approached the problem differently) and
Diem vas in charge. He made the program country-wide rather than build
it up slowly, as his advisers counseled. In addition) it was patterned
after earlier resettlement plans of the French; these had failed because
of resentment on the part of the people affected) the peasants. The U.S.
had slighted the historical record of resistance to resettlement. The
consequence was the failure of an important counterinsurgency effort,
2the failure of an important alternative to a purely military approach.
Gradually, the realization dawned that an alternative to Diem
had to be found. Friction between the South Vietnamese regime and the
A~ericans grew as the U.S. intervention deepened. Diem resisted making
the reforms urged on him by American advisers; he even complained of
"colonialismll by the Americans. Diem was ever more dependent on his
tyrannical brother) Ngo Dinh Nhu. He was isolated from the populace and
was rigid in his mandarin style of governing. These were elements of
his eventual downf'a.LL.
In 1963 the choices facing U.S. policy-makers vere to stick with
Diem, encourage or tacitly support his overthrow, or disengage from
South Vietnam. The first choice was rejected. The third was never con-
sidered because a non-communist South Vietnam VIas still deemed essential.
GPO ed., Bk 3, IV, B2, p. 35.
GPO ed., Bk 3, IV, p , iii.
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The second option was chosen because the United States wanted to succeed
in it s intervent i on. 1
The end of U.S. support of Diem began with peace demonstrations
by Vietnamese Buddhists in the summer' of 1963. The Buddhists I protests
had become a vehicle for mobilizing widespread popular resentment of the
oppressive, arbitrary regime of Diem. American advisers tried to per-
suade Diem to redress some of the grievances, but Diem took a hard line.
He did not understand that changes were needed in his country.2
On August 21, Diem's Special Forces raided Buddhist pagodas,
wounding 30 monks and arresting 1,400. This "decided the issue for us. tt3
'l'he raids were timed to catch the Americans off guard; there was no U. S.
ambassador in Saigon at the time because the newly-named ambassador,
Henry Cabot Lodge, had not yet arrived. 4
"Beginning in August, 1963, we variously authorized, sanctioned
and encouraged the coup efforts of the VLet.nemeae generals and offered
full support for a successor government." The generals first contacted
American representatives on August 23. The Central Intelligence Agency
worked with the generals through Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, a veteran
Vietnam hand since 1944. 6
1", t Papers, GPO e d , Bk 3, IV, B5, pp. 1, 2.ren agon ,
2pentagon Papers GPO ed. , Bk 3, IV , B5, p. ii,
3pentagon Papers , Times ed. , p. 166.
4pentagon Papers, GPO ed., Bk 3, IV,
Times ed., p. 162.
, p. iii.
Times ed., p. 159.
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On August 29~ the National Security Gouncilmet and endorsed the
vi ew Ambassador Lodge that there was no turning back, that Diem had
to be removed from the scene. The initial plot against him proved pre-
mature~ however, leaving more time for American policy-makers to con-
sider the pros and cons. The CIA and the military supported Diem. They
were led by Gen. Paul Harkins~ the commander in Vietnam, who thought the
U. S. was treating Diem shabbily. Members of the \-Jhite House staff and
officials in the U.S. mission in Saigon and in the State Department
favored ousting Diem. One option--pulling out of the war--was not dis-
cussed during the month-long policy review. l
Secretary of Defense McNamara and Taylor visited Saigon in late
September. Upon their return, they recommended a suspension of U.S.
economic aid to coerce Diem ~ but not his overthrow. The bro officials
thought the war could, for the most part, be won in 1964.
The aid suspension was interpreted by the rebellious generals as
a U.S. go-ahead. 2 They again contacted Americans in Saigon. By this
time, Lodge considered it unlikely that Diem would respond to U.S. pres-
sure. He thought the coup should go forward. Harkins still disagreed.
He "ranted to give Diem more time to get rid of his brother, Nhu , The
difference of opinion in Saigon left Washington policy-makers "anxious
and doubtful. 1I But the process was in motiGn, and on November 1 the
coup occurred. Led by Gen. Duong Van Minh, it Has 1Iexecuted with skill
and swiftness. 11 'I'he United States recognized the new governruent a veek
later. 3
GPO ed. , lJk 3, IV, ~ p. iv.
GPO ed. 13k 3 rv p. vi, , J •. "II , ~
GPO ed. , 13k 3 ~ pi , p . viii.,
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Kennedy knew and approved of Diem's overthrow, though he always
fe8.red failure and an appearance of complicity. He was shocked at the
killings of the brothers, Diem and Nhu. Kennedy had had confidence in
the generals' assurances that the two would be given safe conduct out
of the country. Despite the unexpectedly bloody outcome, though, the
main objective had been achieved. l
The Pentagon Papers authors conclude that America1s part in
Diem's overthrow heightened U.S. responsibilities ann its commitment to
the now-leaderless Vietnam. 2 The U.S. deepened its involvement, yet
there seemed to be no alternative. The unreserved conunitment to a
single leader made the American position weak and manipulable. American
influence over Diem was limited; he could get away with murder--and did. 3
Finally, a bold move was necessary to get free of his yoke. Ambassador
Lodge was the key decision-maker.
Ultimately... it was Mr. Lodge--a supremely self-confi-
dent amb'1ssador, a former RepUblican vice-presidential nomi-
nee with independent political power, firm in his view, jealous
of hie.ambassadorial prer~g~tive~, intent all asserting his flill
authorlty--who exerted crltlcul lnfluence on the government.
President Kennedy was killed not long af't.er Diem. He left Pres L;
dent Johnson a legacy of crisis , political instability and mi.li tary de-
terioration in South Vietnam. This, despite his considerable build-up
of combat support and advisory rai s s Lons during his abbreviated admir.is-
t.rat t on , Indeed, Kennedy t s dec i.s i ou to increase the Amer i can
Times ed., pp. 182, 188.
2pentagon Papers, GPO ed., bk 3, IV, p. viii.
:::;;)0 ed., 13k 3, IV, 135, p. iii.
Times ed., p. 163.
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intervention with the addition of more support units was made "a.Imost by
default" because the early in his administration, in 1961, had
been on ground combat units. Horeover, the policies of the Kennedy ad-
ministration were flawed in that they depended on reforms by Diem, and
the reforms were not made. 1
Lyndon Johnson Quickly endorsed the policies Kennedy had fol-
lowed in Vietnam. His first policy statement on the war was National
Securi ty Action ;vlemorandum 273, in which Johnson explained the purpose
of the Amer Lc an intervention as, lito assist the people and government of
(South Vietnam) to win their contest against the externally directed and
supported Communist conspiracy. ,,2
There "las a feeling of optimism among U. S. policy-makers. There
'db.S hope that support of a net government in South Vietnam wou.Ld a110.1
that country to start winning the war. Hopes were dashed, however, when
it "ifJS discovered that conditions in South Vietnam were worse than re-
ports had led '\1ashington decision-makers to believe. The situation
looked even bleaker when a coup in January, 1964, laid bare the adminis-
trative chaos and
South Vietnrun. 3
tical instability that constituted "gove rnn.errt." in
Still, Nnerica was wholeheartedly cowJoitted, NSAM 273 also re-
quested that plans be undertaken for covert operations by South Vietna-
mese against North Vietnam and in Laos. The Department of State '.as
directed to make a case to justif'j such measures. State was to show
Times ed. , pro 85, 113.
Times ed. , pp. 2 , 2
GPO ed., Ilk 3, IV, Cl, p. iii.
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that the Viet Cong were controlled, sustained and supplied froIll Hanoi,
by ,my of Laos and other places. I
Covert operations, Operation 34A, were launched against North
VLet.nam on Febr-uary 1, 1964. Johnson hoped that progressively greater
pressure on Hanol 'mulde force North Vietnam to call off the insurrection
it was believed to be sponsoring in the South. Yet there were doubts
from the start that the effort would achieve its objective of inducing
Hanoi to cease and desist. 2 McKrunara. the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
intelligence conmlunity gave the 34A ra1de5 little chance of helping. 3
South Vietnrul1ese or "h i r ed personnel" did the raiding, k l dnap-
ing and sabotaging. Laotian and Thai troops conducted bombing raides
over Laos. A third pressure device was the presence of destroyers in
the Gulf of Tonkin, but the raids were thought the most important tool
for attacking the lIsource" of the trouble in South Vietnam. 4
Thus did the focus of the war shift to the North, despite Ameri-
can intelligence reports that indigenous sources were behind the insur-
gency in South Vietnam. The adninistration thought attacks on the
Ilor t.h , Lnc Ludi ng bombing. could not help but have an effect on H8J'wi.
The bas i c as ion was ttat North Vietnam. faced with the prospect of
losing its industrial base through direct attacks, would stop the war.
In '} this view can be seen to have been a serious mh)~
of l\orth Vietnam IS detennins.tion to resist. Instead of bringing
GPO (~c1., 1)k 4. IV, C2 (b.), p. ?
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North Vietnam to its knees, the American role in sponsoring covert
operations and some bombing intensified the psychological commitment of
the U.S. to its interventionary policy in behalf of South Vietnam. I1A
demand for more was stimulated and an expectation of more was aroused. nl
A political settlement at this point was not seriously consid-
ered; McNamara and Johnson felt it would mean a communist South Vietnam.
Lodge wanted a carrot-and-stick approach: economic assistance coupled
with bombing. Johnson wanted planning to go forward for an all-out mili-
tary approach, but he hesitated to take real military action. He was
considering the international and domestic political consequences of such
a move; for this reason, the policy debate was strictly internal. 2
For all Johnson1s hesitancy, military planning had reached an
advanced stage. By May 23, 1964, William Bundy, assistant secretary of
state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, had prepared a 30-day scenario
of escalation that included full-scale bombing of North Vietnam and con-
eluded with negotiations that were tantamount to surrender by Hanoi.
The scenario was not implemented as written, but some of its elements
becmne part of later escalatory policies.
On June 1 and 2, American decision-makers met in Honolulu and
discussed an air "Tar. Lodge argued for bombing the North soon to "bol-
ster morale and ve the population in the South a feeling of unity."
The poli rs also stressed the need for obtaining a congressional
IThe penta~on Papers, Senator Gl.'avel EUitiol1, III (Boston:
Beacon PresJ. 1971 , p. 106.
Subs ci t at ions I. ill be as t'o l Lovs : Pentagon PaFers,
Gr ave L eel.. volume awl page number , This. v i Ll, , n to :~~umes
I. - I '" voLurne IT i- the SELue t i t Le , cons i s ts 01 crt t.i c a.L. v, • -"' ..--..., u
essays ished later.
Gravel ed ; , III> r. 107.
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resolution of approval for wider U.S. action in Southeast Asia. Yet
they ended thee. confer.en··ce In generat t . \ d
'- .i. agr-eemen that major act Lons shoul,
be put off for a t Ime , ' ff hAS 0·· soots of the conference, hovever , Army
readiness was incres.sed and information was leaked to the press as part
of a public relations campaign to make Americans accept bolder action in
Southeast Asia. l
Johnson administration policy-makers continued on the route to-
ward a wider war. They continued v i thout regard t.o a CIA analysis--done
at the president's request--that challenged the domino theory that was
the basis of U. S. intervention. By this point, the war was deemed less
Lmport arrt for what it meant to South Vietnam than for what it meant to
the prestige of the United States. The U.S. had so much at stake that
pressinc; anead seemed the only option.
On August ~, 1964, North Vi.e tnameae torpedo boats attacked the
Maddox and Turner Joy, American destroyers patrOlling in the Gulf of
'I'onk i n . Authors of the Papers find the motives for the attacks unclear
but suggest t hat the North Vietnamese might have been trying to recover
face after a July 30 incident in which the Maddox had damaged one tor-
pedo boat and sank a second.
Reprisal raids by American bombers were ordered. 'Targets were
selected from a list first prepared in May. At the same time, President
.Johnson sought congressional approval of expanded military activity
North Vi et.nam , The Ton...k i.n Gulf Resolution passed on August 7,
with only two opposing votes. 2
1 Times ed. pp. 2Lt9-252.,
Times ed. pp. 254 255,> ,
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In a scant three days, the administration had implemented two
. Hay 23 scenario: the prepositioning of air strike
forces and congressional authority for wider military action. Johnson
VJanted to solidify public support for his over-all Vietnam policy with
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution; to a very great extent he succeeded. The
resolution was a virtual blank check. And the air raids took the U.S.
another step up the ladder toward a more complex interventionary role;
the raids constituted another sharp break with the past. They meant a
deeper commitment and less flexibility.
The reprisal air strikes marked the crossing of an im]:or-
tant threshold in the war, and it was accomplished with virtu-
ally no domestic criticism. . . the precedent for strikes
agaiDst the North was thus established....1
The administration reached a general consensus in early September
that air attacks probably would have to be launched on a sustained
basis. 2 At a September 7 meeting of key decision-m~~ers, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff expressed a desire to provoke North Vietnam into acts
that would be answered with an illnerican bombing campaign. John T.
t-1cNaughton, head of the Pentagon's foreign affairs planning staff,
agreed but wanted a gradual application of pressure, not an unrestrained
attack against the North Vietnamese. The principal decision-makers,
however, did not want provocative acts, at least not in the Lmmed i at e
future. CIA chief John HcCone and Maxwell Taylor wanted to wait; so did
HcN~nara. They still wanted to strengthen the South Vietnamese govern-
ment first. 3
lpentagon Papers, Gravel ed., III, pp. 107,109.
GPO ed., Bk 11, IV, C2 (b.), p ,
Gravel ed., III, p. 110.
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Yet from then on--from September 7--there was no basic disagree-
ment among most P.merican policy-makers that military action against
North Vietnam would be required. Tactical considerations merely pre-
vented action right away: the upcoming American presidential election;
shakiness of the South Vietnamese government; the need to maintain a
delicate balance in Laos; the need to increase public and congressional
support~ and a fear that negotiations with North Vietnam might be
brought on prematurely (before Hanoi was really hurting).l
President Johnson still entertained doubts about bombing; he
vranted top priority given to stabilizing South Vietnam's leadership.
The intelligence experts had doubts, too~ that bombing would be effec-
tive. 2 A gap had developed during the planning for a bombing campaign.
It was between the drastic concessions expected from Hanoi and the
modest American efforts policy-makers hoped would break Hanoi 1s will.
North Vietnam's commitment to victory was underestimated and the effec-
tiveness of U.S. pressure vas overestimated. Policy-makers thought
American pressure coupled wi t.h declarations of Amer Lcan resolve would
make the North Vietnamese concede. ~·1oreover, the slow-step air attacks
were
proach,3
to be less repugnant to the U.S. pUblic than an all-out ap-
Another reason for the gap is advanced in the Papers: The U.S.
had run out of alternatives; boniliing was all that was left,4
Ipent~gon f.:..§-r~, GPO ed , , Bk 4, IV, C2 (b.), p , vii.
2pentagon Papers, Times ed., pp. 331,333.
Gravel ed., III, p. 112.
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At the end of 1964, the South Vietnamese political situation
turned st more chaotic, raising fears in Washington that a "Vietnam
solution" (a settlement that would install the communists) would come
about. Officials such as William Bundy were afraid that a sell-out to
the National Liberation Front was imminent. Bundy was concerned that,
for one thing, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand would be jeopardized (the
domino theory). 1
In a January 6, 1965, memo to Dean Rusk, Bundy suggested that
the U.S. take strong action, including the commitment of ground troops
in northern South Vietnmu as well as air strikes against the North.
Bundy and other policy-makers did not think any resultant negotiations
would yield a really secure and independent South Vietnam, but that the
American actions would demonstrate U.S. strength for Southeast Asia as
a whole. 2
The American military soon had another opportunity to show its
air muscle. On February 6, 1965, the Viet Cong attacked a U.S. advisers'
compound at Pleiku, killing nine Americans. In reprisal, forty-nine
Na~J jets attacked a barracks and staging area north of the 17th paral-
lel. 'The air raids, named Flaming Dart, vere intended to be directly
linked with the "larger pattern of aggression fl by North Vietnam. They
wer e des i gned to signal a change in the ground rules in the South, too.
The rules that had prevented direct U.S. counter-measures
Vietnam had been broken. 3 The raids "precipitated a rapidly
North
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sequence of events that transformed the character of the Vietnam war and
the U.S. role in it."1
The changed situation, in which the Americans could be seen to
be more aggress ,created a public relations problem for President
Johnson, who had made much publicly of the home-gr-own nature of the war
in South Vietnam. Public statements stressed the tit-far-tat involved
in the air strikes, and policy-makers sought to focus public attention
on North Vietnamese aggression. Among themselves, however, American of-
ficials had little expectation that North Vietnam would buckle. They
fully expected that the U.S. would go beyond reprisal raids.
They were right. Operation Rolling Thunder, sustained bombing
of North Vietnam, was approved on February 13, 1965. Air assaults began
on a regular basis on March 2, when Amer i c ans and South Vietnamese air-
craft attacked an awnunition depot in North Vietnam. 2 So bombing was
under Hay. There Here reasons for the new policy, but the decision was
made as much because of a lack of other options as because of logic in
favor of it. 3
Air attacks seemed to strengthen the North Vietnamese in their
to keep fighting. As a consequence, decision-makers faced
more hard choices: ease up on the bombing and other military action or
corr~it ground troops. A third option, stepped-up bombing, was ruled out
Ipentagon Papers, Times ed., p. 343.
2pentaeon Papers, GPO ed., Bk iI, IV,
3Pentac;on Papers, 'I'Imes ed., p . 3Lf 1t .
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because of a fear that the People's Republic of China would intervene in
behalf of North Vietnam. l
President Johnson decided to commit ground troops. The decision
was embodied in NSAM 328 of early ApriL Even before then, on March 8,
U.S. Marines had come ashore at Danang to be a security force. They
were supposed to free elements of the South Vietnamese army for other,
more aggressive duty; to send a signal to Hanoi, and to bolster the
morale of the South Vietnamf;se government. General Westmoreland regarded
the Marine contingent as an important first step in a general military
build-up. 2 Indeed, NSAM 328 changed the Marines' mission from defense to
offense. 3
NSAM 328 was an important document. It meant Johnson accepted
the concept that American troops would take part in offensive operations,
though the president still was not free of all doubts. (The degree of
Johnson's anxiety is illustrated by the fact that the memo was kept se-
cret until June 8, when it was disclosed by accident in a State Depart-
ment news release.)
It is pretty clear, then, that the president intended, after
the early April NSC meetings, to cautiously and carefully ex-
periment with the U.S. forces in offensive roles. There was
sober aHareness that the North Vietnamese were not going to quit
and that the U.S. was well on its way to being committed on the
ground. 'I'he Rolling Thunder program. if it was going to bear
fruit at all. certainly was not going to do so in the next few
months.
Ipentagon Papers. GPO ed. , Bk 4 ) IV, C5, p. 4.
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Begun for political and psychological considerations, the bomb-
ing became simply an ongoing military operation. It became conventional,
to use the term in the context of Rosenau's discussion of intervention.
'I'he air war had been based on a serious misjudgment about its effect on
Hanoi's will and capabilities. It had not worked as an exercise in stra-
tegic persuasion; North Vietnam was a poor target because it was not in-
dustrialized enough for air raids to be decisive. Bombing still was
valued by American decision-makers, but it took second place to ground
action in the summer of 1965.
The key figures in the 1965 build-up were Westmoreland and
Johnson. Westmoreland wanted more troops and a deeper military commit-
ment; Johnson was inclined to satisfy the general. By the end of 1965
the emphasis had changed ; American troops in the South numbered 184,314.
They were intent on winning, not just denying their opponents the vic-
tory.l
Also by the end of the year, the American military's tactics on
the ground had changed. At first, troops were kept in enclaves near
bases, with their backs to the sea. The strategy was controversial; ex-
pectations for it ran the gamut. Taylor approved of it, hoping it would
buy time for the Vietnamese army. vlestmoreland thought it would mean
defeat. 2 Westmoreland's view prevailed, as search-and-destroy replaced
static defense. The first big battle involving American troops took
1pentagon Papers, Times ed., pp , 415-417, 459, 468, 469.
2pentagon Papers, GPO ed., Bk 4, IV, C5. p. 6.
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place in mid-November, 1965, in the Ia Drang Valley. About 200 Ameri-
cans were killed. l
Even before the end of 1965, the secretary of defense, McNamara,
had doubts about the efficacy of the U. S. policy in Vietnam. He asked
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a study on the "winnability" of the war.
George Ball, an undersecretary of state, thought the United States should
cut its 10sses. 2 John McNaughton, assistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs, had doubts about many aspects of American
policy, especially the air war. In a memo to the Joint Chiefs, McNaughton
outlined a concept of winning that many would come to embrace; that is,
that winning meant succeeding "in demonstrating to the VC that they cari-
not win. 1l
That kind of victory was what the Joint Chiefs suggested was
possible in answer to McNamara. The assessment, in July, 1965, was that
"within the bounds of reasonable assu.mptions. . . there appears to be no
reason we cannot win if such is our will--and if that will is manifested
in strategy and tactical operations. tt 4
r'lcNamara was not fully reassured. Nevertheless, after making a
trip to Saigon, the secretary of defense recommended sending more troops,
increasing the authorization to 400,000 by the end of 1966, with the pos-
sibility that 200,000 more would be needed in 1967. The secretary acted
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contrary to his own jUdgment that the deployments would not ensure suc-
cess.
• : . Even with the recommended deployments, we will be
faced an early 1961 with a military standoff at a much higher
leve~~.with pacification still stalled, and with any prospect
of mllltary success marred by the chance of an active Chinese
intervention.!
Similarly~ McNamara became disenchanted with the air war. In
March~ 1966, he went along with a Joint Chiefs proposal to bomb POL fa-
cilities in North Vietnam following a 37-day bombing pause. Air strikes
against the proposed targets began in June~ but did not have a signifi-
cant impact on North Vietnam's petroleum supplies. 2
By late 1966, however, McNamara favored a leveling-off of the
air bombardment. He had been influenced by the conclusions of forty-
seven scholars who studied America's Vietnam policy during the summer.
They reported that the bombing had had no effect on North Vietnamese ef-
forts in South Vietnam. North Vietnam was too agricultural~ its trans-
portation system too flexible to be hurt fatally by American bombing. 3
Along with stabilizing the air war~ McNamara liked anQther pro-
posal of the group of scholars: installation of an electronic barrier
across the Demilitarized Zone. He approved of the new approach because
infusions of more troops were unlikely to work when they hadn't in the
past. Also, a big deplo~nent would cause inflation in South Vietnam,
and repeated escalations would not be acceptable to the U.S. public or
convince Hanoi of American constancy. The secretary of defense thought
lpentagon Papers, GPO ed. ~ Bk 5~ IV, c6 (a.), p. 25.
2pentagon Papers, Times ed., p. 480.
GPO ed., Bk 5, IV, (a. ), pp. , 91.
the emphasis should be on building friendly forces only to a level suf-
ficient to neutralize large enemy units so as to prevent their inter-
fering with the pacification program.
Pacification had been generating new interest in ~he summer of
1966. The program Of provi d.Lng security for civilians and of winning
their allegiance to the South Vietnamese government had not been keeping
pace. Ambassador Lodge and Westmoreland wanted it increased. "Nation-
building" had a new place on the priority lists of U.S. policy-makers.
The new interest was short-lived, though, as a lull in combat ended and
funerican attention again turned to military operations. l In any case,
the pacification program was, inappropriately enough, an American pro-
gram.
its
Vietnamese officials played a secondary role; therein lay one of
2
or problems.
McNamara's new thinking was reflected in an October 14 memo, in
which he recommended installing the electronic barrier, stabilizing the
air war and limiting increases in U.S. forces in 1967 to 470,000 men.
The Joint Chiefs objected. They wanted strong action against North Viet-
nam, not a slowdown. The memo said fino" to the military for the first
time. The judgment of the military leaders would no longer go unques-
tioned. An important precedent had been set. As a quick, cheap victory
crone to be seen as the illusion it was, the reality of Vietnam as a quag-
mire took hold. Military leaders became more isolated. 3
'I'hus from 1966 on, there were essentially three camps: 1) the
57. 62.
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McNamara group of disillusioned doves who tried to set limits and reduce
the war; 2) the military--the Joint Chiefs and Westmoreland--who wanted
a wider war, and 3) President Johnson and the State Department, who
sought some middle ground. l
During the first part of 1967, the air vlarwas the main point of
controversy. McNamara and McNaughton wanted to de-escalate; the military
wanted a step-up. In the middle were William Bundy of the State Depart-
ment, Air Force Secretary Harold Brown, and President Johnson. 2
For the president, a turning point came after the seven-day truce
in honor of the Tet holiday in February. A peace mission by Prime Minis-
ter Harold Wilson of Great Britain and Premier Alexei Kosygin of the
Soviet Union failed. In addition, Hanoi used the truce period to resup-
ply its troops. Johnson approved more bombing targets on February 13.
He stayed with the air war despite considerable opposition within the
administration and despite intelligence estimates that it did little
good. 3
Pnother catalyst for debate was a new request for more troops
from Vlestmoreland; he wanted 200,000. The Joint Chiefs urged mobiliza-
tion of reserves as well, plus incursions in Laos, Cambodia and perhaps
North Vietnam, and the mining of North Vietn81nese ports. In short, they
wanted a solid commitment to victory. But the president wondered if the
Times ed. , p. 511
2pentagon Papers, GPO ed. , Bk 6, IV, C7 (b. ) , p. 1-
3Pentarron Papers, GPO ed. , Bk 6, IV, C7 (b. ) , pp. 7 , 8.0
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North Vietnamese '.lOuld just add more divisions, and he still ,{anted a
greater effort from South Vietnamese forces. l
The split between the military and civilian leaders came down to
two options: 1) give Westmoreland the 200,000 troops and so widen the
war, or 2) give troops but not so many as to require a reserve call-Up,
and suspend bombing in the North.
The debate continued throughout 1967. McNaughton urged a cut-
back in bombing. He warned that the ft~erican public was uneasy, that it
perceived a governmental establishment !lout of its mind" with respect to
Vietnam. McNamara became ever more pessimistic. The Joint Chiefs play-
ed down his pessimism and the president put distance between himself and
his secretary of defense. Johnson heeded McNamara on troop levels but
not on bombing targets. 2
The critical turning point for U.S. policy in Vietnam came in
1968, after the Tet Offensive. The offensive, which began on January 31,
took the administration by surprise. Its strength and intensity height-
ened the jolt felt in Washington. Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, hurried off to Saigon. He came back with the predictable
news that Westmoreland needed more soldiers, 206,000 by year's end.
This would have required a reserve call-up.
A fork in the road had been reached. Now the alternatives
stood out in stark reality: fro accept and meet General
~fueeler's request for troops would mean a total U.S. military
commitment to South Vietnam--an Ameri can i z.at.Lon of the war, a
call-up of reserve forces, vastly increased expenditures. To
deny the for troops, or to attempt to cut it to
a size which could be sustained by the thinly stretched active
lpentagon Papers, GPO ed , , Bk 5, IV, c6 (b.), pp. 73-77, 84, 85.
2pentagon Papers, Times ed., pp. 5
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forces, would just as surely signify that a.n upper limit to
the U.S .. military commitment to South Vietnam had been
reached. l
By this time Clark Clifford had replaced McNamara as secretary
of defense. So when Johnson ordered a senior group of advisers to re-
view U.S. policy in Vietnam, the group became known as the Clifford
Group. Paul Warnke, head of the Pentagon IS po.l i tical-military policy
office, and his associates, Morton Halperin and Richard Steadman, were
dominant voices. They were among the administration's leading dissi-
dents. 2
The Clifford Group reassessment indicated that no ground strat-
egy and no level of additional U.S. forces alone could bring about an
early end of the war. Moreover, the group concluded that more escala-
tion of the American involvement could touch off a domestic crisis in
the United States. The study group recommended a policy of buying time
for the South Vietnamese, enabling them to make their political and
military leadership effective. 3
General vmeeler was appalled. He quickly spotted two II flaws II in
the Clifford Group recorr~endations: They would mean fighting in or
close to popUlation centers, and they would permit enemy troops to mass
near population centers, especially north of Saigon.
The initial Clifford Group report, therefore, was revised and
sent to the president on March 4. The recommendations from the secre-
tary of defense were a compromise between civilians in the Pentagon who
Ipentagon Papers, GPO ed., Bk 5, IV, c6 (c.), pp . 2,15,16.
2pentae;on Papers, Times ed , , p. 598.
3pentagon Papers, GPO ed , , Bk 5, IV, (c.), p.
wanted no troop increase and the Joint Chiefs, who wanted to regain. the
initiative. A deployment of 22,000 troops was suggested. The Clifford
Group did not take advantage of the chance to turn U.S. policy around. l
Meanwhile, public pressure against Johnson was growing. Dean
Rusk was grilled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Corn-
mittee chairman, Senator J. William Fulbright, warned against alI-out
war. Eugene McCarthy did well in the New Hampshi r e primary ; his showing
was correctly interpreted 3.8 a sign of deep pUbl:i c discontent with
Amer i.can policy in Vietnam. News leaks on t.roop levels and Robert
Kennedy's entry into the presidential race demoralized Johnson further. 2
On March 22, 1968, Johnson announced t nat. 'tlestmorcland would be
recalled and made chief of staff of the Army. Thi s Wi1S a signal that
the pres i derrt had decided against major es caLa.t i on of the ground war.
Decisive advice came to Johnr;on on Barch 25 and 26. It was from an in-
formal advisory group consisting of policy-makers (Dean Acheson,
Gen. Matthew Ridgway, t;laxwell 'I'ay'Lo r , and others). Most had been hawks,
but nov they felt bombing and sending more troops vrou.Ld do no good..
Their assessment II surprised" the president. 3
J ohnson 's dec is ion to seek a nev strategy wa.s made publ.i c Mar-ch
31. He announced a partial bombing halt and only a token troop increase.
Hone of the 200,000 troops Hestmoreland had asked for in February were
to be sent. The biggest news was that the president would not seek re-
election.
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reality that more of the same wouLd not help
the situation in Vietnam, and that it voutd further divide Americans at
home. cans had gone to Vf.et.nam to help the South Vietnamese, but
they had gradually assumed the burden themselves. The political objec-
tives seemed attainable with military means. This belief went un-
questioned for a long time as civilian policy-makers relied on military
commander-s to tell them what progress was being made. The Tet Offensive
s~owed how little progress had been made. Suddenly the political, eco-
nomic and social costs of fighting a no-v i n war had become too great. l
ed., IV, pp.
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BERNfuiD FALL ON U.S. POLICY IN VIETN1Uq
Bernard Fall believed r!estern policy toward Vietnam was an ac-
cUlnulation of many subtle [;loves and small decisions, none decisive in
itself and all seerLingly unavoidable at the time. For a while, the im-
pact of certain actions was reversible; some options remained. Gradu-
ally, however, choices became fewer and their results more consequential.
Policy partners become 'allies,' opponents become 'enemies'--
and the hitherto inconse~uential options become 'sole1TI1 cownit-
men t.s ' whose bond has to be underwritten i-rith the blood of one's
citizens and the total resources of one's economy. And there
is an under3tandable tendency, once the conflict has become
overt, to validate retroactively all policy decisions that led
to this situation. l
III Fall's opinion, "lest ern policy-makers erred early with respect
to Indochina in general and to Vietn81n in particular. Subsequent policy
was built upon tne initial errors, so that, in the words of historian
Arthur Schlesinger, "error create(d) its own reality.!! fl..merican policy
t ovard Vietnam during the 1950s and '60s was developed to comport wi t h
an error-created reality. Decisions were based on the misinterpretation
of facts or on the deliberate dismissal as irrelevant of important facts. 2
Fall was extremely critical of DieIT; and of United States support
of him. That support illustrated the inclination of Amer Lc an pOlicy-
makers to turn a blind eye to certain conditions that conflicted with
1Bernard Fall, Viet-Nam \4itness O~e,{ York: Praeger , 1966), p , 4.
all, Vi et-iJam vlitnes~" p , 3.
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their beliefs. Diem vas hailed as an emerging Southeast Asian democr-at,
on the verge of bringing country into the mainstream of nations.
If his regime had. failings they were attributed to his brother,,
IIgo Dinh Nhu, and to Madame Nhu. Yet this official picture ignored the
facts that, South Vietnam was a dictatorship at the village level, the
heart of the soc
, and that Diem had almost been upset twice before
pennit funerican militarJ
the successful coup in 1963. 1
Another error, Fall thought, vas one of amiss ion. It "ms the
failure of the Uni t ed States to support France in Indochina during the
1940s, with the result that the postwar fate of Vietnam waS influenced
in no small measure by the U.S. even before 1950, when American policy-
makers decided to back France against the Viet Minh. The U.S. weakened
France's postwar position in the Far East. 2
Dur ing the war, as the French were try ing to hold off t.he
Japanese, they asked for funerican aid. It was refused. The State De-
part.ment thought Japan "JaS bluffing. French field commanders finally
had to g i ve in to the superior Japanese force. 3 When some Fr-enchnen
mounted a rebellion against the .Japaries e , President Roosevelt did not
to help.Il
United States policy was based on FDR's belief that the French
had misruled Indochina.. Fall thought that FDR had a fixation about
French Indochina, that he gave it undue attention, and that his
, Viet-~am Witness, p. 5.
"r·'Y'''''·~rd Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military
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decisions affecting it were divorced from reality. FDR proposed a
trusteeship (China, Britain and the U.S.) for Indochina after the war to
prevent the French from resuming control. Churchill) however) who vas
less anti-French, vetoed the idea. l
History might be far different, Fall suggested, if the United
States had acted with more foresight. For example, .~erican pressure
on French colonialists and on Ho Chi Minh to keep Ho's Democratic Repub-
lie of Viet-Nam (recognized by the French in 19)-16) in power could have
been helpful. It might have led to Ho's becoming an Asian Tito, or he
have revealed his "aggressiveness" earlier and thus become the ob-
ject of a unified Amer-Lcan-Fr-ench antL-commurris t effort. If this oppor-
t.un i t.y had not been missed, the French-fought colonial war from 1946-54
could have been avoided.
But, "lith the Lnev i t abi Li t.y of a classical Greek tragedy,
poll in Saigon, Paris, and Hashington (Hanoi was to
join t.he list somewhat later) usually picked the course least
likely to produce tangible long-~a.nge r es u.Lts , b~t t~e one
closest to the path of least r-es i s t anc e at the t Ime ,
U.S. support of Ho Chi Minh would not have been Wholly inconsis-
tent 'tl1th past practice. The American ass (Office of Strategic Services)
helped him in 1944-45, and when the Viet Minh came to power it seemed for
a time that the U.S. was backing him. But then the Americans pulled back.
Ho was intelligent, a resourceful pragmatist who was a Vietn8JTlese
3first, a communist second. His energy and zing ability, and that
o t he r too . t 1 d r s enabLed them to set up a "peop'Le I sof 8 few L commuril~, •ea e '" co -
'1\/0 Viet-Hams, p ,
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democracy" while their country vas occupied by Chinese Nationalists,
Br i.tish and French military f'orcen and U. S. observers. This accomplish-
ment, under t h e very nos es of 1tlesterners ~ was indicative not only of
Ho IS ab i I i ty but also of the confusion and lack of understanding that
clouded the \<lectern perception of Vietnarl1 at the time. l
In thl s context , it is not surpris ing that Amer i.can policy-
makers could do a virtual about-face in 1950 and begin aiding the French~
ab andon i ng Ho Chi Mi.nh ~ the' bogey of communism.
Three thine;s propelled American policy-makers toward a rigidly
anti-communist policy in Vietnam: the fall of China to Mao Tse-tungls
forces; the advent of Senator Joe McCarthy, who saw tlRed u everywhere;
and the outbreak of the Korean vTar. Suddenly ~ Amer i c ans saw things dif-
f'e r errtLy . Baa Dai, the Vietnamese emper-or whom the Japanese had install-
ed and vhom the French later euppo r-ted , gained respectability as some-
more than a puppet. Ho Chi Minh , in policy-ma-Kers I eyes, lost
whatever nationalistic coloration he had; he was a comrnurrl s t , pure and
simple. And the cause of the French in Vietnam was perceived as worth
the investment of American noney and equipment because it represented a
. 2
communIsm .
.~erican supplies began flowing to the French: $1.1 billion
worth by the time hos t i I Lt.Le s ended July 21, 1954. The cost to the
French for eight years of val' WDS $10 billion; ,000 ::"renchmen were
dead or iss 3 The rationale for contributing AnerLcan money and
IF'aJ 1, '1''''0 Viet-Nar1s, p.
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materiel to what became a lost cause is articulated in this sentence
t'r om a speech President Ei senhover- on November 12, 1953: "The loss
of Indochina will cause the fall of Southeast Asia like a set of
dominoes." This was the f'undar1ental principle of American intervention
in Vietnam. l
Fall concerned himself "lith military tactics as well as the mak-
ing of abstract policy. It would have been instructive had later Ameri-
can leaders taken to heart "That he said of the French mill tary exper--
ience in Vietnam. Many French mIstakes were repeated by the Americans.
A major French mi.Lf.t.ary leader was Gen. Henri Navarre, who took
control of French Union Forces in the Far East in the spring of 1953.
He brought the promise of more American aid and fresh French troops. He
also brought the Navarre Plan, which was intended to make French forces
more mobile and aggressive.
Navarre sent troo[ls to seek out the Viet Minh in the mountain
uplands. He dropped parachute bat.t.al t ons into the valley of Dien Bien
Phu in an effort to get North Vietnamese General Ciap to conillJit his best
army divislons. But French intelligence underestimated the strength of
Ciap's e-rmy; ~O,OOO cormnunist soldierti were concentrated around Dien
Bien Phu. They were too much for the French. The ensuing siege and
Vietnamese victory Here decisive to the outcome of the French Indochina
2Hal'.
the concept of mobility, but not well.
He dispersed his soldiers too widely. This, Fall maintai~Ed. was the
1. Two Viet-Nfu;:S. p.
1, , 31, , 35, 38.
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major lesson to be drawn from French tactics in the last year of the war.
Another lesson was that air superiority involving underdeveloped areas
was of limited usefulness. The French air force had little impact on
the Viet Minh. l The Use of air power and the dispersion·of troops on
search-and-destroy missions were mainstays of American military involve-
ment in Vietnam. Neither approach was very effective.
Writing in 1956, Fall quoted L. M. Chassin, a commander of the
French Far Eastern Air Force:
The West ...risks becoming technologically incapable of
dealing with an enemy whose ground troops advance single file
on jungle paths2 supplied from depots and arms factories inmountain caves. .
The description of the "enemy" might have come from a news re-
port in the mid-196os.
Earlier in 1954, before the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu ef-
fectively ended the French Indochina War, Fall had suggested that nego-
tiations offered a better solution. His objective was to keep Vietnam
whole, and he thought economic aid from the West might make this pos-
sible. A split would deprive both the North and the South of raw ma-
terials from the other. 3 But the aid program was not to be. The coun-
try vas divided by the Geneva agreement, si on July 21, 1954.
The Geneva pact provided for a temporary division of Vietnam,
but this was not the first choice of either side of negotiators. The
Saigon delegation "ranted territorial unity and national elections under
the ion of the United Nations. The Viet Minh at first wanted
nationwide elections, too, but agreed with Chou En-lai of the People's
Viet-NaIll \.fitness, p , 39 21"al l, Viet-NaIll Wi tness, p. 40.
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Republic of China to accept "temporary regroupment areas." Chou and
Premier Mendez-France did the actual negotiating at Geneva. The dele-
gates from Britain and the Soviet Union acted as go-betweens. l
The United States had for all practical purposes withdrawn from
the peace conference. Secretary of State Dulles left Geneva in Hay,
even before the conference began; the U.S. became an observer. Archly
anti-communist America did not want to give the impression of approving
a surrender to communism, as some no doubt interpreted the results of
the Geneva conference. Instead, the U.S. submitted a separate declar-
ation vowing to "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb"
the agreements reached in Geneva. 2
Fall was critical of the U.S. refusal to accept a full measure
of participation in the Geneva negotiations. By its action, the U.S.
lost the chance to shape the terms of the settlement and to use its
power to implement the pact. 'I'he American course was an abdication of
. l' .. 3responsibility, ln Fal s 0plnlon.
As for the Vietnamese nationalists, they faced lithe contempt of
their enemies and the indifference of their allies. 1I The French by-
passed nationalist delegates and dealt with the Viet Minh directly.
Diem's foreign minister, Tran Van Do, declared his mission a failure and
resigned. He had fought unsuccessfully against partition and then for a
neutral zone in the Catholic area of North Vietnam.
IFal1, Viet-Namv!itness, pp. 61,71.
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Fall thought the Geneva: agreement a diplomatic success in view
of the difficult circumstances. l But.it did not take long for the agree-
ment to come apart and for its flaws to become evident. 'I'he document
was signed not by the South Vietnamese but by the French. It was essen-
tially a military pact, and the South Vietnamese army was under French
control in 1954.
This being the case, Diem declared the document not binding when
it came time for the all-Vietnam plebiscite in July, 1956. The North
had more people than the South, so the vote on the future of the country
probably would have gone against Diem. Diem also spurned North Vietna-
mese overtures to normalize trade relations.
Shortly thereafter, North Vietnamese who had remained in South
Vietnam after the mass movement of people between the two new countries--
stay-behinds, Fall called them--began a terrorism campaign that led to
the Second Indochina "\-lar. One of the failures of the Geneva agreement
was the inability of the International Control Commission, set up to
administer the peace, to do anything about the guerrilla activity.2
vlhy the insurgency in the South? Fall considered its causes
both internal and external. North Vietnam took advantage of the unrest
in the South brought on by failure of the Diem government to confront
the country's problems. Fall described the conditions that prevailed
in 1951:
The Diem was riding into the trough of a popularity
\{ave vho se crest may well have been the proclamation of the
first ican constitution in October, 1956; ... a
1Fall, '1'1,10 Viet-Nams, p. 231.
Viet-Nam Witness, pp. , 78,
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catastrophically slow land reform and a lagging economic tempo
vrere alienating the vast mass of landless peasants and unem-
ployed or underemployed nonagricultural laborers; and. . .
poverty-stricken but militarily powerful North Viet-Nam could
not possibly fail to take advantage of these glaring vulner-
abilities, so thoughtlessly offered to it. l
fill important additional fact must have motivated North Vietnam
to support malcontents in the South, according to Fall: U.S. advisers
to Diem were so blind to the real weaknesses of South Vietnam under the
dictator that a rebellion might succeed before the Americans caught on. 2
Optimism rather than close scrutiny of the situation became the rule for
the Americans: "Unlimited optimism not only became part of official
policy with regard to events in Viet-Nam--it was policy as such. 1I 3
American policy-makers underestimated the threat posed by the
f1 s t ay - b eh i nds fl and did not see the flaws in the South Vietnamese govern-
ment. The policy-makers, Fall contended, had the f1na i ve belief fl that
1) most Viet Minh were not communists but anti-French nationalists; 2)
that Diem, an anti-French nationalist, would win them over; 3) that the
Viet Minh would therefore collapse. Operating under these misapprehen-
s ions, the U. S. failed to treat the "last remnants tI of the Viet Mi.nh as
anything more malignant than a dying force; no serious effort was mount-
ed to defeat them. Amer i.can military leaders regarded internal-security
problems they caused as a police problem. They saw their own job as
that of training the South Vietnamese to counter a Korea-style onslaught.
Viet-Nam Witness, p. 10.,
2Bernard Fall, "Viet Cong--the Unseen Enemy in Vie:t-Na..m, tl The
eds., Bernard Fall and Mar-cus G. Haskin (New York:
i , p , 256.
p. 9.
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Meanwh'iLe , the insurgents took control of the rural areas. They
terrorized the populace. In 1958-59, terrorism was such that local
South Vietnamese officials were being killed at the rate of ten a day.
Sti.ll the Americans did not discern the character of the hostile forces
at work.!
By Febr-uar-y 9, 1962, bovever , when the Military Assistance Com-
marid was sec up in Vietnam, the "last remnant" theory bad been demol-
ished by the sheer size of the insurgency. An inspection trip by Gen.
[vIaXldell 'l'aylor in October, 1961, had lifted the veil from before policy-
makers' eyes. The spread of revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam
finally was recognized and the invasion theory was born.
Fall contended that, although there were some aggressbrs from
the outside, these could not account for the extent or persistency of
the insurgency. A significant number of the insurgents were home-grown--
nurtu1"ed on the injustices of the Diem government. But because A.merican
policy-makers did not see or acknowledge this, they had to pay the price
2
of an extens I ve military involvement.
Even "ithout North Vietnamese action, then, South Vietnam would
have been vuLner ac Le because of the ato:aization of the sod ety under
Diem. 3 :Diem was a monarchist, an elitist, fiercely Catholic. He would
not compromise. He considered all opposition subver-s i ve. Stubborn
courage and family solidarity were his chief traits. Diem exacted
dictatorial powers from Baa Dai when he 'tcceded to the emperor ' s request,
I Fa1J, 'I'1,[0 Viet-N:OIDs, pp. 32 L" 325, 328.
T\w Vict-Nams, p. 330.
Vjet-N3J11 vlitness, p. 137.
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in June, 1954, to become premier, and he guarded his powers jealously
ever after.
Superficial governmental reforms were enacted, but the real re':'
suIt was more controls and less freedom for the average South Vietna-
mese.
l In 1956, Diem abolished elected village councils and mayors, ef-
fectively bringing the dictatorship to the peasantry and ensuring the
loss of any remaining support at the lowest leveL In 1957, Diem went
after the former members of the Viet Minh. 2
Fall complained of Diem's arbitrary and undemocratic exercise of
executive authority. (Fall was dismayed at how uncritical American
scholars and government officials were of this authoritarianism and of
Diem in general.) He believed the major problem with the Diem regime
was that it had no contact with the grassroots. He thought Diem. was
doomed because he had lost touch with his people. 3
Diem discriminated in favor of Catholics, causing 14idespread
religious tensions. He abused the Montagnards, the mountain dwellers,
by trying Lo force their assimilation into Vietnamese society. Because
of their strategic location in the Central Highlands, the Montagnards'
cooperation would have been necessary for South Vietnamese victory.4
Diem forcibly quelled organized resistance from three sects, the Cao-Dai,
Hoa-Hao and Binh-Xuyen, instead of granting their request to broaden his
government.
IFall, Two Viet-N&os, pp. 237, 4, 270.
2Fal l, lIViet Cong--the Unseen Enemy," p. 256.
3Fa l l Viet-N&o IHtness, p. 286.,
, "Viet-Nam--T'he
Ham Header, Fall and Raskin, pp. 331, 3
51"a11, Viet-Nam VIitnes~3, p. 1
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Diem played groups off against one another: refugees against
indigenous South Vietnamese; Montagnards against lowlanders; Buddhists
against Catholics; pro-French against pro-American Vietnamese; the army
agains t the civilians; peaaant.s against city dwellers. 1 All of which
gave credence to the assessment of North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong
in 1962:
Monsieur Diem's position is quite difficult. He is unpopu-
lar, and the more unpopular he is the more American aid he will
require to stay in power. And the more American aid he re-
ceives, the more he will look like a puppet of the Americans
and the less likely he is to win popular support for his side. 2
Diem did get more American help. He did not gain popular sup-
port among his people; indeed, American policy-makers never attached as
much importance to Diem's need for support as Fall did. Until late 1963,
the Americans accepted Diem on almost any terms. vmether South Vietna-
mese citizens felt an allegiance toward him or had confidence in his
leadership was, for all practical purposes, irrelevant.
President Kennedy increased military aid and gave U.S. soldiers
ever more latitude to go on the offensive in South Vietnam. American
policy, though, lacked a grand design. It was an improvisation based on
the assumption that all would be well once the last Viet Minh had been
killed and the last Vietnamese farmer relocated in a "strategic hamlet." 3
The strategic hamlet program, begun in 1962, was supposed to
counteract the insurgency. It consisted of rounding up South Vietnamese
peasants and putting them in hamlets where they were, in theory at least,
1, llrrhe Agonizing Reappraisal,1I p , 332.
Viet-Nam Ihtness, p. 112.
3Fa1l T\w Viet-Nams, p. 333.,
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beyond the influence of the guerrillas. The counter~guerrilla effort
was patterned after Britain IS successful program in Malaya. Yet the
situation in Vietnam differed from what it had been in Malaya. The eco-
nomic, social, political and military conditions that enabled the pro-
gram to succeed in Malaya did not exist in Vf.et.nam,
The terrorists in Malaya, part of the Chinese minority, were
identifiable; in Vietnam the antagonists were all Vietnamese. Food
could be denied the guerrillas in Malaya; not so in Vietnam, where it
was available virtually everywhere. There was no sanctuary available in
Malaya as there was in Vietnam (Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam). Commu-
nist indoctrination of the populace was much more advanced in Vietnam
than in Malaya. Finally, the Vietnamese guerrillas were better armed
than their counterparts in Malaya.
Thus Fall saw little to inspire hope in the strategic hamlet
program--or, for that matter, in the other components of the early-1960s
build-up: more weapons, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, chemi-
cal Harfare compounds and more American advisers. Believing in counter-
insurgency as a cure-all ..ras wishful thinking, in Fall's view. 1
"Hevolutionary warfare" was the term Fall preferred to counter-
insurgency, not that he thought the U.S. or South Vietnam Has success-
fully waging it. Hevolutionary warfare connoted a political factor
missing from the American intervention in Vietnam. In 1962 Fall wrote
that "the communist challenge in Southeast Asia has yet to be faced on
IFall, Viet Warn Hitness, pp. 271-273.
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its real terrain: t.hat, f' d
" oi 1 eas, policies and down-to-earth effective
administration. HI
A political and spiritual void in South Vietnam was a major weak-
ness of the American-South Vietnamese position, Fall believed. South
Vietnamese did not have confidence in their fight because they could not
see promise of better times in it. And American policy-makers did lit-
tie to bring about the political and social reforms that could have
brightened their prospects. 2
The Americans did what was easiest: concentra.te almost exclu-
sively on the military side of the war. The North Vietnmrrese and the
Southern insurgents recognized the contest as a political one. The com-
munists knew that the central objective of a revolutionary war is to win
the allegiance of human beings. American policy-makers stressed the
protection of power groups and the control of cOl11Jflunications lines~ land
areas~ military installations and the like. The people were abused.
U.S. policy was to focus on the external military symptoms of the revo-
lutionary war. This~ Fall thought, II s i mpl y has no bearing on the pre-
ponderant politico-socio-economic components ll of the conflict.
Moreover, the military tactics the U.S. employed were inappro-
priate. ~he classic hunt-and-kill operation~ the approach used most,
brought results as frustrating to the Americans as they had been to the
French earlier. The French and Americans looked for set-piece battles,
3but the North VIetnamese were not about to accom~odate t em.
lFall, Viet-Nam Vlitness, pp. 265, 266.
2Fa l l, Two Viet-Nwns, p. 335.
3pall 'I'vo Viet-Nams, pp. 345-349, 380.,
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1~e French had had a weapons monopoly in aviation and armor.
Making the best of that situation, the Viet Minh t.ranarer red the war to
a level that nullified the French edge in weaponry. The Viet Minh were
mobile, f'aat.-mov i ng ; their troops were dispersed, able to attack a
French military unit and fade into the jungle. Despite the lesson in-
herent in the history of France in Vietnam, American military planners
relied (overrelied, Fall felt) on big weapons and large, usually un-
wieldy troop contingents. l
Fall returned often to the theme of de-emphasizing the purely
military aspects of the war. He maintained that the real need was for
improvements in the physical, n~ral and political conditions of ordinary
Vietnamese. He considered the U.S. failure to press Diem for meaningful
reforms and the neglect of the political features of the insurgency
major shortcomings of the American intervention. 2
In 1964, after Diem had been removed from the scene, Fall looked
back on a decade that had been marked by too much enthusiasm for Diem
and inadequate appraisals of the deterioration in South Vietnam; by
faith in old ideas about pacification and population control and not
enough consideration of how to win short of all-out military action. 3
The effect of the U.S. interventionary policy 'Nas that, by 1964,
the Vietnamese war was in lithe shadowland between unattainable victory
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and unaccept ab l.e surrender. Fall saw these policy options: 1)
T'do Viet-l'!ams, p. 382.
Viet-Ham Hitnes~, r- 270.
, ~------
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Hithdraw American troops at a given date, regardless of the outcome.
2) Continue the eXisting "proxy "Iom,r ll for as long as an additional ten
years. 3) Turn the war into a conventional battle, with full-size com-
bat operations against North Vietnalll and perhaps the People I s Republic
of China. 4) Negotiate with the enemy, but from a position of strength. l
Fall favored the last option. Its essence was a kind of Ameri-
can saber-rattling in the cause of peace. It envisaged freeing North
Vietnam from a threat from China in exchange for cessation of guerrilla
warfare in the South. Fall's was the proposal of an LrrteLl i gent mod-·
erate; it was neitber particularly hawkish nor dovish.
Hawks among American policy-makers soon ruled the day~ however,
Moderate approaches to a solution in Vietnam lost out in 1965 to the
introduction of large numbers of jlJl1erican combat troops and warplanes.
The war became more nearly the conventional battle Fall hoped could have
been avoided.
Fall lamented the "enormity" of the American commitment, espec-
ially as it related to the air bombardment within South Vietnam.
What changed the character of the Vietnam war was not the
decision to bomb North Vietnam; not the decision to use Amed-
can ground troops in South Vietnam; but the decision to wage
unlimited aerial warfare inside the cguntry at the price of
literally pounding the place to bits.-
The vra.r had turned impersonal ~ callous, beyond a human scale.
Fall decried the torture of prisoners and other violations of the rules
of war. In i nt er-vi ews with American commander-s he found little know-
of the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention on War Victims.
lFall, "Our Options," The Heporte:', pp. 18,
2Fal l, Viet-Num Witness, p.
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Fall seemed at once awe-struck and depressed by the influx of
American firepower and manpower. They made the war, in the short run,
militarily unlosable. The magnitude of the U.S. role invalidated past
comparisons with French activities in Vietnam. On September 24, 1965,
American bombers (excluding B52s) delivered more bomb tonnage than the
French Air Force did during the 56-day battle of Dien Bien Phu.
The reliance on American firepower, Fall predicted, would lead
to a South Vietnam plowed under by bombers and artillery. And still it
would be without sound political leadership.l He recommended in late
1965 that the air war against North Vietnam be de-escalated (l1little
would be lost milit arily l1 ) and that negotiations take place without con-
ditions. The notion that the war could be shortened by bombing the
North was an illusion, he thought. As in Korea, the North's transpor-
tation system could survive on the strength of human coolies.
In spite of the military escalation in 1965 and '66 and the fact
that the conflict had become in most respects an American war against
North Vietnam, Fall insisted that it still was a Vietnamese war. On
that basis, he kept arguing for alternative policies. Eighty percent of
South Vietnamese lived in rice paddies; it was here, Fall contended,
that a solution to the Vietnam problem lay.3 He wrote in 1966:
A major attempt must be made to 'politicize' rather than
to further 'militarize' the Vietnamese conflict and to treat
it as what it really is--a local conflict with outside sup-
port which has gotten out of hand, not the St~ingrad or
EI-AI81nein of a world-v;ide co1d-yrar cont'r-ont.at.i on ,
all, Viet-Nam viitness , pp. 301, 305, 306.
2 Viet-Nam Hitness, pp. 326, 330.Fall,
3Fall Viet-Nam Hitness, p. 344.,
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He urged that attempts be made to induce the National Liberation
Front and the South Vietnamese government to think in terms of a South
Vietnamese political solution. The United States and North Vietnam were
to recede into the background.
It would indeed be a pity if so much ingenuity, diplomacy,
blood and treasure should have been spent on trying to persuade
Hanoi to abandon the insurgents in South Viet~Nam, without a
solid attempt ever having been made at getting the insurgents
to modify their relationship with Hanoi in return for a specif-
ically South Vietnarnese solution that could be as honorable
all ar-ound as it would be realistic. The only alternative to
such an approach would be a further escalation both in terms
of battleground and participating countries.. 1
Of course, no such meeting of minds in South Vietnam took place.
The NLF was not recognized and dealt with as a potentially constructive
political force, as Fall suggested it should be. And the non-communist
Vietnamese body politic was not restored to health, also as he pre-
scribed. 2 Instead, American military planners, ignorant of the strength
and resolve of their Vietnamese adversaries, held sway. Their ignorance
was relieved by the Tet Offensive in 1968. After that, a dramatic al-
teration of American policy in Vietnam occurred. By then, Fall had been
dead a year.
IBernard Fall, "Viet Nam in the Balance," Foreign Af'fa'i r s , XLV
(October, ), 16-18.
2Fa l l, Viet-Nam Witness, pp. 345, 346.
Chapter 4
CONCLUSION
The Pentagon Papers add important details to the history of
American intervention in Vietnam. They corroborate much of the litera-
ture about the intervention and illuminate the attitudes and goals that
underlay it. They show that the guiding principle was constant through
four administrations: A non-communist regime was to be set up in South
Vietnam and communist "aggressors" were to be defeated. l
Careful reading of the Papers reveals facts that belie some of
the official pronouncements made at the time. For example, the Papers
indicate that when the United States escalated its involvement in Febru-
ary, 1965, policy-makers knew of no regular North Vietnamese Army units
in South Vietnam. Five months later there still. was speculation as to
whether North Vietnamese soldiers "Tere in or near South Vietnam. Mean-
time, however, American government officials were contending that U.S.
troops were defending South Vietnam from an armed attack from the North.
Anything in the Pentagon Papers that tends to discredit the of-
ficlal line is there in spite of rather than because of the efforts of
the authors. Although the analysts who prepared the Papers seem to have
agreed in general that U.S. intervention in Vietnam may have been a
lNoam Chomsky, liThe Pentagon Papers as Propaganda and as History,1I
The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel Ed~tion, V, eds., Noarn Chomsky and
Howard Zinn (Boston: Beacon Press, 191 2), pp. 119,190,
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costly error, they were far from being doves. They operated within the
framework of the official anti-corrnnunist ideology and treated government
assertions as fact.
One reason the Papers give for resuming the bombing campaigns
after the Tet, 1967, truce was that North Vietnam moved supplies into
its southern panhandle. Yet American military leaders moved troops dur-
ing the truce and set a one-day record for the amount of cargo air-de-
livered to soldiers in the field. This the government analysts ignored,
even though a few journalists (led by I. F. stone) reported it at the
time. l
Thus one shortcoming of the Pentagon Papers as history is the
pro-government bias that resulted from the affiliation of the analysts,
who were part of the government establishment or staff members of think-
tanks with close ties to it. The chairman of the Defense Department
task force that authored the Papers, Leslie Gelb, noted the deficiency:
"The people who worked on the Task Force were superb. Of course,
we all had our prejudices and axes to grind and these shine through
clearly at times. "
Gelb also addressed himself to the ground rules of the project.
Analysts had access to almost all Defense Department and Central Intel-
ligence Agency files and to some State Department materials. They had
no access to the White House. Personal interviews were prohibited; only
documents were used.
and
This approach to research "ras bound to lead to distortions,
distortions we are sure abound in these studies.
To bring the documents to life, to fill in gaps, and just
lChornsky, pp. 184, 185, 189, 196.
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to see what. th~ 'outside world I was thinking, we turned. to news-
papers, per-Lod.i ca'l.s , and books. vIe never used these sources to
supplant the classified documents,but only to supplement them. l
(The analysts used the book liTo Move a Nation, II by Roger Hilsman,
to develop their account of how Diem was removed from office and killed.
Hilsmanwas director of the State Department bureau of intelligence and
research from 1961-63 and assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern
Affairs from 1963-64.)2
So the Pentagon Papers are a distillation of the documentary re-
cord, and the assumptions of the documents are carried over. Yet their
pro-government orientation does not invalidate the Papers as useful re-
sources for students of American intervention so long as the students
appreciate their special character. In a 'vlay, this one-sidedness is ap-
propriate, for it is both a symptom and a symbol of the mind-set that
prevailed among American policy-makers. It was a mind-set that, as
Bernard Fall noted, enabled umrarranted optimism to become an integral
part of the interventionist policy.
It was this dangerous optimism that Fall tried to correct with
facts. He did not gather his facts only from. documents in Hashington
but traveled to both Vietnams and talked with principals on both sides
of the conflict. He interviewed North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong
in Hanoi in 1962. In 1958, he examined complaints to the International
States
p. ix.
lU.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, United
Vietnam Relations) 1945-1967, Hearing, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
20,1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911),
il Sheehan and others, The Pentagon Papers as Published by
the New York 'rimes (Ne\{ York: Bantam, 1971), p . 168.
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Control Commission against South Vietnam and concluded that there was
some coordination between the Viet Minh rebels and North Vietnam. When
writing of the counter-insurgency program, Fall stressed that his aasess-
ment was based on "knovn and verifiable facts alone, II not on personal
opinion or wishful thinking, which he felt tainted other assessments. l
Fall's determination to think independently and his apparent in-
defatigability gave objectivity and thoroughness to his description of
Vietnam and of the impact the French and Americans had on it. Fall
viewed Vietnam comprehensively. He considered the plight of the peas-
ants, the special interests of various social and cultural groups and
the general economic interests of all Vietnamese. He recognized the
need for a broed.-based South Vietnamese government to deal with the
country!s basic problems.
In contrast, the Pentagon Papers deal with the formulation and
execution of American policy (the major component of which was conven-
tional military activity) within the context of a narrowly defined goal:
to stop a so-called communist onslaught. After a while, the interven-
tion sought to uphold America's prestige and world position. The cause
of a free South Vietnam became secondary.
Fall attempted to convince U.S. policy-makers they were in
error. He began in earnest after a trip to Vietnam in 1951, when he
, l.thi th D' . ' 112 Fewcame back with "pr-oof of the cor-rupt.Lon Wl. In . e . r em r-egime , .
1 t N W·t (>lev York' Praeger. 1966).Bernard Fall, Vie-l1am 1 ness l~" " ,
pp , 184,
2Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a War (Garden City, N.Y.:
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policy-makers listened, but Fall persisted. Bill Moyers, press secre-
tary to President Johnson, related this anecdote:
I never met Fall, but in early 1966 my White House col-
league, the late Hayes Redmon, did. One afternoon.he announced:
'I have just talked to a man who says we are headed for catas-
trophe. He says that by becoming surrogates of colonialism in
Indochina we have gone over to the wrong side of history.' Per-
iodically, Redmon, a former Air Force officer who abhorred the
war, would summarize Fall's articles and circulate them to as-
sociates. No policies changed, but a few eyes were opened grad-
ually.l
As South Vietnron was coming under North Vietnamese control in
1975, Moyers quoted Fall's wife to the effect that the late historian-
political scientist considered such an outcome inevitable because of the
superior spirit of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. 2
Of course, there is a danger here of lionizing Fall. He was not
omniscient, nor did he possess superhuman prescience. And his early
writings have a tinge of pro-French bias despite his protests to the con-
trary and the fact that all his university education was obtained in the
United States. Still, Fall combined a commitment to scholarship with a
desire to put the results of his scholarship to work in policy-making.
This is at the he art of the Lmpu.Lse to mak e political science more "rele-
vant" and "action-oriented. 1I
As Fall practiced it, political sc i.ence was a problem-solving,
quest Lon-nnswer-tng discipline closely relat.ed to a real-vrorld issue. He
"coula have been expected to feel a kinship to'tlard those who emphasize
substance over technique in political science, "rho think the discipline
IBill
1975, p. 100.
Reflections on a vial', It Newsweek, April 21,
2r.10yers, p. 100.
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sbould speak to real human needs, who be] ieve knovl.edge must be ap-
plied. l
FallIs knowledge was seldom, if ever, applied. The American
policy-making establishraent was selective in using facts about the war,
and Fall's facts were unwelcome. Policy-makers were more comf'o.r-bab.Le
with wishful thinkers who saw victory in just a little higher level of
military activity. The result of this self-delusion was that the U.S.
intervention in South Vietnam became--even before the 1970s--f1one of
the single most incredible failures of American foreign policy.tl2
It was an exceedingly costly failure. Betveen January 1, 1961,
and April 13, 1974, 56,555 Americans died in Vietnam. Of these, 7,198
were blacks; 64 percent vere 21 or younger. Dead officers totaled
6,892; dead enlisted men, 49,639. Deaths from non-hostile causes num-
bered 10,326, including 381 suicides. In January, 1976, the figures
were updated and included casualties incurred in the Mayaguez incident
(the seizure by Cambodians of an American ship). Total deaths then
stood at 56,869. 3
Vietnamese losses were higher. Civilian war casualties alone
(killed or wounded) in South Vietnam between 1965 and 1973 have been put
at 1. 4 million. South Vietnamese refugees generated during that period
totaled 10.3 million. 4
can
lDavid Easton, tiThe New Revolution in Political Science," Ameri-
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The P..merican intervention also was costly in terms of dollars
Between 1950 and 197 4, United States economic and mill tary
assistance to Vietnam amounteq. to $23.9 billion: $16.1 billion in Inili-
tary assistance, $7.8 billion in economic ai.d. l
Intervention was expensive in a less quantifiable way, too.
Domestically, it was extremely divisive. It had class and racial over-
tones: A disproportionate share of the fighting was done by poor whites
and blacks. It created a gulf between the young and the old. Vietnam
crone to symbolize the lack of faith youths had in the older generation.
Internationally, the intervention was condemned as an ugly imperialistic
venture.
Monetary and social costs of intervention were not foreseen, how-
ever. vmen they were seen the intervention had reached an advanced
stage, had gradually evolved as the product of a decision-making process
influenced by many factors. Among them were the personalities of Ameri-
can leaders and their perceptions of their roles in government, and the
realities of the international system: in short, the individual, role
and systemic variables discussed in Chapter 1.
The potency of individual variables is illustrated in this ex-
cerpt from a report by James Reston of the New York Times on the 1961
Vienna conference between President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev. It
suggests that Kennedy's defeat at the Bay of Pigs caused him to enlarge
the American commitment in Vietnam.
A f'ev minutes after this meeting President Kennedy told me
that Khrushchev had decided that 'anybody stupid
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Ab-
Print Office,
enough to get involved in that situation (Bay of Pigs) was im-
mature, and anybody who didn't see it through was timid and,
therefore, could be bullied. '
Kennedy then dispatched 12,000 American troops to Vietnam de-
spite warnings from his advisers that his actions were contrary to ear-
lier statements about avoiding an Asian land war. l Did Kennedy esca-
late the Areer-i.c an intervention to show Khrushchev that he was tough and
could not be bullied? That may well have entered into his decision.
President Johnson did not regard himself as a weakling either.
As president, he could not picture himself leading the United States in
a retreat. He thought more and more military pressure was the answer.
Johnson felt confined by his own restrictions on the war (to it
within South Vietnam, for instance) and secretly plotted for expansion.
Johnson's ally was General Westmoreland. Both were committed to
winning, at least before the Tet Offensive. Because running the war was
left largely up to the military, and because the public was not aroused
events in Vietnam until late in the game, Johnson and Westmoreland
had virtually free rein. They were responsible for the most dramatic
phase of' the intervention, the introduction of large numbers of combat
troops and the bombing of North Vietnam.
The structure of the international system (loose bipolarity: two
blocs vying for members) facilitated intervention. The woeful instabil-
of' South Vietnam invited it; the er the instability of a nation
the the likelihood of intervention an external power. And the
LdeoLoa i c aj. the war represented enhanced the interventionists'
p. '7
St , Sam Johnson I s Boy (New York: Macmillan, 1968),
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belief in the rightness of their cause--the more so as the war vas. per-
ceived to have been instig,.ated by an exterual. nO"ler. P Li k
-. y v 0 ;Lcy-ma ers
justified increasingly drastic measures as necessary to preserve democ-
racy against communfsm.
In fact, the power blocs might have done better to have left
Vietnam alone, to have left it relatively uncommitted. It could have
been a necessary buffer between the blocs. Uncommitted nations are im-
portant as mediators in the loose bipolar model of the international
system. Even today, Vietnam, though in the communist bloc, is not
aligning itself too closely with either the Soviet Union or the People's
Republic of China.
But the hands-off treatment was not to be, and Vietnam's history
has been one of persistent outside interference. The impact of American
interventionists began to be felt in 1950 when policy-makers rejected
Ho Chi Minh in favor of supporting the French war against the Viet Minh.
From that point the American interventionist policy evolved through a
number of identifiable stages.
These can be summarized by adapting James Rosenau's operational
definition of intervention (a convention-breaking phenomenon that is
authority-oriented). Rosenau's concept connotes sharp beginnings and
clearcut that do not perfectly fit the history of American in-
tervention in Vietnam up to mid-1968. Nonetheless, the break-with-the-
past idea is useful in discussing watershed events, and practically all
the interventionist activities Here political, aimed at decision-makers
and government processes.
Adopt "t" of pa.ssl"ve observer at the Geneva confer-the posllon
ence in LI at once limited the ability of American po.Ii to
shape a peace and left them freer to
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the provisions of the
agreement. This arms-length attitude and irrational fear of communist
influence caused the United States· to embr-ace D1' em and h i t' tu . ·lS 8epara 18
tendencies rather than working for a unified Vietnam.
United States accepted Diem's decision to reject a plebi~
scite in 1956. Thereafter, the American goal vas to preserve a non-com-
mun i s t state in South Vietnam. The concomitant U.S. readiness to apply
force made a confrontation with North Vietnam and insurgents in the
South inevitable. Not that U.S. policy-makers realized or acknowledged
this. The Vietnamese rebels were not taken seriously; nor did the glar-
ing faults of the Diem government receive needed attention. Thus did
American leaders end the 1950s in a state of dangerous ignorance.
A further step into the quagmire was taken early in President
Kennedy's administration when Kennedy ordered Special Forces and more
advisers to South Vietnam. He showed his willingness to go far beyond
the restrictions of the Geneva accord. ~1ore recommendations for addi-
tional American troops followed, as did some unsuccessful counter-insur-
gency programs and a growing disenchantment with Diem. In a sense,
t 21, 1963, can be labeled a crucial date, for it was then that
Diem ordered his special police to raid Buddhist pagodas, finally con-
vine funericffil leaders that the dictator had to go.
ldhat if an alternative to Diem had been found years before? The
b "d t ~ r Ion·a tl"me It is almostneed for an al ternati ve had een ev i.r en r o a '0 .".
tl ' "It have been ~urely the South Vietna-to s pe culate on us m1g1- - d. ~
mes e and their American helpers could have done no vor s e .
vii th the advent of the Johnson administration, the Americffil
.nr f"IlGL:J:i S on a mi build-up intensified, even as the political
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instability and military deterioration 1,1"ithin South Vietnam continued.
Johnson expanded the war , turned it northward and made it effectively
an American undertaking. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August, 1964,
was a critical step into deeper involvement. It gave Johnson a virtual
blank check to increase military activities against North Vietnarn, es-
pecially air raids.
An influx of American ground troops was next in the escalation.
In 1965, the American military went on the offensive in the fullest
sense. Yet results still were unsatisfactory, and questions gradually
arose among American policy-makers. From 1966 on, doves, hawks and
middle-of-the-roaders made up three policy-making camps.
In 1968, the 'I'et Offensive brought all policy-makers up short.
'I'he bankruptcy of the American intervention became clearer than it had
ever been. President Johnson saw that a change was imperative. In
late March, he took himself out of the race for re-election, and an-
nounced a partial bomb halt and just a token increase in troops.
Johnson acted not only out of the realization that military
means would not bring about the political ends sought, but also out of
the knowledge that ~merican citizens would not tolerate an open-ended,
ever larger war. These two facts were central to the failure of the
American intervention in Vietnam. Military tactics could not .overcome
the politicized Vietnamese revolutionaries, so Ame r i cans withdrew their
support.
Effective military power requires not only the technological
capabili ty to fi but also the material, political and psychological
s~pport of the society from which the power spr The soci-
imizes the mil A relatively hi of mili t ar-y
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legitimacy vas possible before the Vietnam war because of the clearer
perception of the combatants and of their causes. I V· t hn :I.e nam, owever,
ambiguities abounded because of the political-psychological nature of
the war. The legitimacy of the military was undermined.
Responses to this type of (revolutionary guerrilla) war-
fare e pr-of'es s i.ona.l flexibility, :institutional adapta-
tion, political astuteness and understanding on the part of
civilian and military leaders. In essence, such a response
required a restructuring of traditional civil-military rela-
tionships--not an easy adjustment for any society, nor one
that is necessarily desired. l
In short, Americans, to their credit, could not adjust to the
demands of the "limited" war in Vietnam that looked less and less limit-
ed. ~.1any began to see a contradiction in a modern democratic society
fighting against highly motivated revolutionaries in defense of an un-
democrat i c puppet government. The war began to seem immoral, and the
deaths of many Amer l cans intolerably '>lasteful.
Disenchantment with the U.S. intervention was present among
members of the mil too. A survey of 173 Army generals who com-
manded in Vietnam showed more than fifty percent thought, in September,
197LI , that U.S. troops should not have participated in combat. Fifty-
three percent of the generals had a negative assessment of the U.S. com-
bat role. (Note that this was before the final rout of the South Viet-
names e in
The used some hindsi
, of course; they were too fear-
ful of dest their careers to
out earlier. But observations
The Hal' 1'1ana.r,ers (Hanover, N. H.: Un i vel'S
) 1 r,h i r,8., . - /" . , ./
Sarkesian "Revolution and the Limits of Hili tary Pover :
er of vletnam,ll Social Science Quarterly, LVI (March,
677.
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about the futility of the American intervention were possible without
hindsight. They were offered ~y critics during the vlhole course of the
war. One of the most accurate critics was Bernard Fall.
Yet trial and error more nearly characterized U. S. policy than
did reasoned approaches based on facts. Eventually, the conclusion that
nothing vfOrked was unavoidable. An American who was a civilian official
in Vietnam expressed it concisely:
I got a very clear cture that American policy in Vietnam
was vrong , Because it didn't work and because it couldn't work
and because vhatever there was to or to lose , it was per-
fectly clear the longer you prolonged it the more was lost. l
American policy in Vietnam was based on the false assumption of
a monolithic cornmunl s t aggression directed at taking over all of Indo-
china domino-style. In fact, more important was nationalistic zeal on
the part of the victorious Vietnamese and a commitment to rid their
country of Westerners. Because funerican tactics were geared to the
false assmnption rather than the reality, they failed. In the end, all
the U.S. had worked for in Vietnam was lost.
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